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CONGRESSIONAL WILL AND THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE
IN BIVENS ACTIONS: WHAT IS SPECIAL
ABOUT SPECIAL FACTORS?
ANYA BERNSTEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Say a government actor violates a person's constitutional right. In an odd
federalist twist, what recourse the person has depends on which government level
the violator acted for. If the government actor was cloaked in the mantle of state
authority, the victim can sue under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.1 If, in contrast,
the violator acted on behalf of the federal government, the victim has no explicit
statutory cause of action. She may, however, be able to sue the government actor
directly under the U.S. Constitution on the theory articulated in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.2 Both § 1983 and
Bivens impose monetary liability on errant government agents who violate
individuals' constitutional rights.3 But, as ajudge-made remedy, Bivens has been
* Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., The University of Chicago; B.A., Columbia University. Many
thanks to Michael Coenen, Nicholas Day, William Eskridge, Aziz Huq, Jonathan Masur, James
Pfander, Alexander Reinert, and Lior Strahilevitz for helpful commentary.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law .. "); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 172 (1961) (concluding that § 1983's use of the phrase "under color of' does not limit the
statute to acts undertaken in the authorized, legally correct pursuit of state law, but encompasses
acts cloaked with state power undertaken by "those who carry a badge of authority of a State and
represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it"),
overruled by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). James Pfander reveals the provenance of the case's unusual name,
noting that the government attorneys' "suggest[ion] that the agents were 'unknown' at the time of
filing but were later identified and served with process, and thus 'named' does not explain why
the complaint itself, writtenpro se, "referred to 'Unknown Named' agents." James E. Pfander, The
Story ofBivens v. Six Unknown-Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in FEDERAL
COURTS STORIES 275, 281-82 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010) [hereinafter Pfander,
The Story of Bivens]. Pfander presents a "more plausible" explanation, confirmed by Webster
Bivens himself: "from the plaintiff's perspective, the agents simply had 'unknown names."' Id.
at 282.
3. Section 1983 provides remedies for violations of any federal right, not just those
guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Somewhat analogously, the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) of 1946, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006), provides a remedy against the United States (not
the individual actor) "for injury. . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
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subject both to skeptical scrutiny by commentators 4 and to somewhat ad hoc
development by the Supreme Court, which has allowed a case-by-case
determination of whether "special factors" preclude constitutional damages.5
These "special factors" have become a central concept in Bivens
jurisprudence, yet no court has ever defined the term. This does not mean,
however, that "special factors" has no definition; by developing the special
factors inquiry over time and through case law, courts have delimited the
concept's contours quite clearly; they just have not explicitly articulated what the
concept is. This Article provides that articulation. By illuminating the rationale
of Supreme Court special factors jurisprudence and canvassing circuit court cases
to see how this rationale has been applied, I derive the definition of special
factors from existing case law.
This is possible because, as I show, special factors jurisprudence has not
been as adhoc as it seems at first glance. Building on Supreme Court precedent,
federal courts of appeals have developed a coherent approach widely shared
among the circuits. Identifying that approach and explaining its underlying
rationale, as I do here, gives courts an explicit, workable model for applying the
special factors analysis in Bivens cases. We need such a model because without
it, outlier cases can fail to recognize that special factors is a term of art rather
than a simple descriptive phrase-a bounded legal analysis, not an appeal to
judges' sensibilities. Such misrecognition has led to occasional incongruous
opinions whose special factors analysis comports neither with the accepted way
of conducting the inquiry, nor with its underlying rationale.
A. The Contours and Rationale of the Special Factors Analysis
This Article shows that the special factors analysis has evolved into an
inquiry as to whether Congress has indicated that it wishes to reserve
decisionmaking about remediation in some area for itself.6 If Congress has
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
4. See, e.g., James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 98 GEo. L.J. 117, 121 (2009) (arguing that courts should change their
approach to evaluating a Bivens claim).
5. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550-51 (2007).
6. 1 am, of course, not the first to connect Bivens remedies to congressional will. But
because I focus on explaining the development and rationale of special factors, I can provide a more
thorough analysis of the case law that has shaped the doctrine and expressed its underlying
reasoning. Most scholarship that makes this connection instead presupposes the relationship and
makes reform proposals on that basis. See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, Preemption ofBivens Claims: How
Clearly Must Congress Speak?, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 1087, 1122-23 (1992) (proposing a clear
statement requirement for congressional preclusion of constitutional damages remedies); Kristina
A. Kiik, Comment, Quantum of Competence: Balancing Bivens During the War on Terror, 62
SMU L. REv. 1945, 1963-64 (2009) (proposing that courts treat legislative action as more of a
special factor than executive action).
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indicated that it has already provided all the remedies it thinks are due, or that it
prefers that no remedies at all be provided, courts find that special factors
preclude recognizing a constitutional damages remedy.7 If Congress has not so
indicated, courts feel confident recognizing a remedy directly under the
Constitution.8 As this description suggests, the special factors analysis maintains
the balance of powers between two specific branches of the federal government:
the judicial and the legislative.
It may be helpful to think of this process as analogous to federal preemption
analysis: while preemption analysis primarily maintains the balance of powers
between Congress and the states, special factors analysis maintains the balance
of powers between Congress and the federal judiciary.9 The analogy is not
perfect because the vertical concerns of federalism do not map perfectly onto the
horizontal concerns of the separation of powers. However, it can be a helpful
shorthand because special factors analysis employs techniques drawn from
preemption analysis.
In its early version, the special factors analysis looked for explicit
congressional preclusion of Bivens remedies, requiring something like explicit
preemption.' 0 Subsequently, it incorporated a version of field preemption,"
where thorough occupation of a legal area by Congress indicated that there was
no room for judge-made remedies. Finally, the special factors analysis has
broadened in scope to include something resembling implicit preemption 2 : ifthe
statutory language indicated that Congress wished to reserve the creation of
remedies for itself, courts refrained from recognizing constitutional damages
remedies. As this description suggests, throughout its development, the special
factors analysis has focused on whether congressional legislation precluded
constitutional damages remedies against federal actors.
7. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1988).
8. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980).
9. Preemption analysis often addresses the relative authority of executive agencies and the
states, but executive agency rules preempt state law only to the extent that Congress delegates that
preemptive power to the Executive. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 374-75 (2000) ("'When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate."' (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635-36 n.2 (1952))). The power of preemption, in other words, usually lies with Congress even
when others exercise that power for Congress.
10. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956) (explicit preemption occurs when
federal law and state law directly conflict).
11. Id. at 504 (field preemption occurs when "federal statutes 'touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system (must) be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject' (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947))).
12. Id. at 502 (implicit preemption is when the "'federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it' (quoting
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230)).
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Through the special factors analysis, Bivens has come to allow relief in the
limited set of situations for which Congress has neither legislated remedies nor
expressed a preference regarding their existence. 3 Bivens fills the gap when
Congress has not indicated how a particular situation ought to be handled. By
inquiring into congressional will, the special factors analysis keeps courts
sensitive to whether there is a gap to be filled. In this way, Bivens remedies
allow courts to vindicate constitutional guarantees of individual rights while
coordinating their authority with the legislative branch. The meaning of the term
"special factors" has changed substantially since its first, somewhat offhand, use
in Bivens. But throughout those changes, the term has consistently concerned the
distribution of authority between the judiciary and the legislature.
This approach is not only grounded in precedent, it fits the logic of judge-
made remedies. By allowing a damages action for a constitutional violation,
Bivens attempts to act out Marbury's conviction that a right ought to come with
a remedy. 4 But, as the Bivens opinion intuited, it also threatens the separation
of powers between the judiciary and the legislature, as courts assume the power
to create causes of action and provide remedies-a power normally exercised by
Congress. 5 Through the special factors analysis, courts ensure that their
vindication of constitutional rights does not infringe on Congress's authority.
Of course, the judiciary and the legislature are not the only branches that
have a hand in crafting remedies. The modem executive branch, with its
administrative remedial schemes and its prominent role in the process of
legislation, also plays a part. However, as the Bivens case discussed throughout
this Article indicates, the Executive's role in remedy-creation is still subordinate
to that of Congress. Administrative remedial schemes must be authorized
through a delegation of congressional power to the Executive and are subject to
legislative strictures and specifications. Although the President often plays a
significant role in the crafting of legislation and must sign a bill into law, it is
still Congress that debates and passes it. 16 Responding to these realities, case law
regarding constitutional damages consistently looks to congressional will to
ensure that judge-made remedies do not disturb the balance of authority between
the judiciary and the legislature.
B. Why This Analysis Now
Special factors analysis developed into its present form gradually, over many
cases and courts. This is why, in contrast with much of the scholarship on
Bivens, I look not just to the Supreme Court but also to the circuit courts to
13. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-
96(1971).
14. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("'[I]t is a general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at
law, whenever that right is invaded."' (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23)).
15. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-97.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1-2.
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understand the meaning of "special factors." The Supreme Court has
sporadically indicated what direction it has wished special factors analysis to
take, but much of the doctrine has been developed, refined, and cohered by the
federal circuit courts.
This is not to say that the courts of appeal have failed to follow Supreme
Court precedent, or even that appellate case law is in tension with that of the
Supreme Court. On the contrary, Bivens's special factors jurisprudence
instantiates a common phenomenon in doctrinal development: The Supreme
Court sketches broad parameters for approaching an issue, and the appellate
courts follow that lead to fill in the details. This Article illuminates this doctrinal
history at both court levels and explains what the special factors analysis has
come to mean-something courts need to understand to determine whether to
recognize a constitutional damages remedy in each particular case.
As I have noted, in most cases, the appellate courts have implicitly or
unconsciously recognized the thrust of the special factors analysis and applied
it appropriately. Why, then, is the explicit discussion I present here necessary?
Without an explicit understanding of the doctrine's development and rationale,
courts may fail to understand that special factors analysis focuses specifically on
the separation of judicial from legislative authority, not from that of the
executive. This distinction becomes especially important as the courts see
increasing numbers of lawsuits challenging harms incurred through national
security projects. The legal context of such lawsuits often fits squarely within
the traditional Bivens domain, but there are important differences. First, these
cases implicate national security policy; second, they often inspire publicity.
These non-legal aspects of some contemporary Bivens cases can make the legal
issues seem new, as well.
Because of the political prominence of the Executive in these cases, courts
that do not understand the rationale of the special factors analysis sometimes
invert the inquiry, focusing on the balance of judicial and executive, rather than
legislative, powers. By tradition, the executive branch is considered to have
special authority in the area of national security. 17 But this competence does not
give the executive branch the authority to legislate or preclude remedies for those
whose rights are violated in the course of such projects. That authority belongs
primarily to Congress, which remains the proper focus of special factors analysis
even in cases involving national security projects. By explaining the doctrine's
rationale and detailing how it has developed, I give courts facing Bivens claims
a principled and precedent-based model for performing the special factors
analysis.
This Article differs from much of the scholarship on constitutional damages
precisely because my aim is to give courts a useful tool for dealing with Bivens
claims now, rather than to reform Bivens jurisprudence. My analysis derives
17. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918,926-27 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) ("It is equally well-established that the judiciary owes some measure of deference to the
executive in cases implicating national security, a uniquely executive purview." (internal citations
omitted)).
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from my survey of case law. I do not claim that this is the way Bivens ought to
work. On the contrary, constitutional damages are ripe for reform, and a number
of scholars have proposed vehicles for improvement. James Pfander and David
Baltmanis, for instance, have suggested eliminating the special factors analysis
altogether and, instead, advocate treating Bivens cases like those arising under
§ 1983.8 Pfander and Baltmanis point out that, while Congress has not legislated
a Bivens remedy, it has entrenched constitutional damages in American law by
passing legislation that presupposed the availability of a Bivens remedy.19 They
suggest matching the statutory preclusion of Bivens remedies to the Supreme
Court's "relatively narrow view of the implied displacement of § 1983 claims."20
Others have proposed letting Bivens suits run against the federal government
itself, rather than only against federal actors in their individual capacities.21
18. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 4, at 121 (explaining that under their proposal, "the
special factors' that the Court has taken into account in deciding whether to allow an action would
no longer operate as a threshold barrier to litigation"). Not everyone finds the parallel convincing:
George D. Brown has argued that § 1983, concerned as it is with the relations between states and
the federal government, is not an appropriate analogue to Bivens's exclusive focus on federal
government issues; additionally, Bivens's basis in the federal Constitution weakens the contention
that Congress always has superior authority in crafting remedies. See George D. Brown, Letting
Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs-Have the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J.
263, 266 (1989). As I discuss, though, courts have not followed this lead.
19. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 4, at 132-33 ("[N]ew remedies under the FTCA were
designed to supplement, not displace, the Bivens action.").
20. Id. at 143. Pfander and Baltmanis specifically propose the § 1983 preclusion standards
enunciated in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246,250-60 (2009), which held
that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006), did not displace
a § 1983 action challenging a school's inadequate response to allegations that a child was being
sexually harassed. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 4, at 143. Fitzgerald concluded that the
"remedial schemes [were] parallel rather than inconsistent" because Congress had not expressed
a "legislative intent to displace § 1983 claims[;] ... had not put in place detailed or more restrictive
remedies that would suggest the inapplicability of constitutional tort litigation[;]" had tailored Title
IX to a different "substantive scope of coverage" than that of the Equal Protection clause; and had
limited Title IX remedies to the "responsible governmental entities" rather than to "individual
officers." Id.
21. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public
Officials'Individual Liability under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 65-68 (1999). Pillard claims that,
insofar as the government indemnifies officials sued in their individual capacities under Bivens, the
individual liability requirement of Bivens "undercut[s] Bivens's remedial efficacy" by allowing a
range of defenses that often defeat otherwise meritorious cases and creating an "illusion of an
opportunity to obtain damages" that allows Congress and the courts to avoid dealing with the very
real problem of bad conduct by federal actors. Id. at 67-68. James Pfander has suggested that
federal government indemnification for officials sued under Bivens is not automatic: "[legal
representation" for personal capacity suits "requires a written request from the agency head and a
finding that representation will further the interests of the federal government." James E. Pfander,
Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages,
[Vol. 45:719
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Undoubtedly, other ways still remain to make constitutional damages actions
more predictable, sensible, and congruent with other areas of law. However,
lower courts do not have the luxury of making such changes themselves:
Reforms like these can be instituted only by the Supreme Court or by Congress.
For now, lower courts must employ the special factors analysis, and this Article
explicitly delineates what this analysis entails.
C. Why Bivens Is Important
The idea of permitting remedies against government actors who violate
individuals' rights did not start with Bivens but had been around for centuries.
Either the government itself or the officers acting in its name were amenable to
suit in England beginning in the thirteenth century; by the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, English "reports ... abound[ed] with cases against inferior
officers."22 In the United States, by the time Bivens was decided, such remedies
usually took the form of injunctions granted under the theory of Ex Parte
Young.23 Based on the long-term availability of injunctions in such cases, Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Bivens noted that its result was hardly radical.24 Since
federal courts already granted injunctions in such situations, judge-made
Ill COLuM. L. REV. 1601, 1609 n.36 (2011) [hereinafter Pfander, Resolving the Qualified
Immunity Dilemma]. Still, the actual frequency of such designations, and of indemnification,
remains unclear; most commentators assume that federal employees are routinely indemnified. A
number of other works have proposed government, rather than individual, liability under Bivens.
See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 100
(1983) ("[I] fenterprise liability for official misconduct is substantially expanded, society can enjoy
significant and unambiguous gains."); William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning
Tort Liability of Government and its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.
REV. AM. U. 1105, 1110 (1996) ("Congress should amend the FTCA [to extend] respondeat
superior and exclusive liability of the United States to Bivens claims.").
22. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 15 (1963) (collecting cases). Jaffe argues that suing the government was easier in
England than in the early Republic because the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not prevent suits
against the King.
[Miany claims affecting the Crown could be pursued in the regular courts if they did not
take the form of a suit against the Crown. And when it was necessary to sue the Crown
eo nomine consent apparently was given as of course.... By a magnificent irony, this
body of doctrine and practice, at least in form so favorable to the subject, lost one-half
of its efficacy when translated into our state and federal systems. Because the King had
been abolished, the courts concluded that where in the past the procedure had been by
petition of right there was now no one authorize to consent to suit!
Id. at 1-2.
23. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
24. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 404
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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remedies for federal employees' constitutional violations were nothing new.
In recognizing a damages remedy, he reasoned, the Court did not create a new
judicial power so much as apply an existing power to a class of people whose
injury could not be addressed through an injunction. 6
In fact, Jerry Mashaw has demonstrated that the Bivens remedy was even less
novel than this reasoning implies." In late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century America, people whose rights were violated by federal employees had
"broad opportunities for common law damage actions" against them.28 Such
opportunities came not through special judicial dispensation but simply as a
matter of common law tort: "private citizens objecting to official action by an
agent of the United States had ample legal weapons at their disposal."29
Legislators and ordinary American residents shared the presumption that
damages actions were available in such situations-and not just available but
necessary to keep the government in check. "Americans valued common law
actions and criminal prosecutions, subject to trial by jury, as protections against
the depredations of federal officials."30 Indeed, because federal agents were
subject to suit in their individual capacities, and because their only affirmative
defense was that "they had acted entirely properly pursuant to the laws of the
United States,"3 working as a "federal administrative agent may have been
legally quite treacherous. 32 Damages remedies against federal employees were
once the norm.
Such private remedies remained available throughout most of the nineteenth
century: While "immunity had been somewhat precariously established for
cabinet level officials" 33 in the postbellum period, "lower level officers were
protected only by a reasonableness defense in a few instances provided by
statute. And other suits involving private rights, but indirectly challenging prior
official determinations, followed the forms of private actions that hardly
acknowledged their public law implications."34 At the time the U.S. Constitution
was written, a common law cause of action was simply presumed to exist, and for
at least a century after the Constitution was framed, individuals could sue public
officials who had violated their constitutional rights for damages.
The growth of the administrative state forced courts to balance the
importance of smooth and continued government functioning against traditional
25. Id. One could point also to suppression of evidence and invalidation of a statute.
26. Id.
27. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006).
28. Idat 1341.
29. Id. at 1328.
30. Id. at 1322.
31. Id. at 1331.
32. Id. at 1325.
33. Jerry L. Mashaw, FederalAdministration andAdministrative Law in the GildedAge, 119
YALE L.J. 1362, 1379 (2010) [hereinafter Mashaw, FederalAdministration].
34. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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remedies in tort and spurred the development of official immunities.35 This act
of refraining around the necessity of effective governmental operations, rather
than individual right, obstructed the existing common law remedies for
constitutional violations.36 Bivens, then, did not invent a new remedy so much
as it reinstated an old one in a new version. As people's practical ability to sue
errant federal actors diminished, the Court reintroduced a remedy that had been
universally available when the Constitution was written."
Bivens thus reinstated a previously available remedy, and it has come to
"play[] a central role in our system of constitutional remedies."38 As recent work
by Alexander Reinert suggests, while commentators seem convinced that Bivens
actions are futile and the Supreme Court appears hostile toward them, Bivens
actions continue to be viable at lower court levels and secure approximately the
same success rate as other kinds of civil rights cases.39
There are also other reasons to think that our system of government requires
some version of constitutional damages. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Bivens
famously noted that injunctions have no remedial effect for violations that are not
ongoing or likely to be repeated, he stated, "For people in Bivens' shoes, it is
damages or nothing."4° The question becomes whether we prefer nothing over
damages. That question leads squarely to what we think constitutes a right and
what it entails-an issue the full exploration of which falls far beyond the scope
of this Article. I will note, however, that if we think of a right as something that
is real only insofar as it exists in the world-that is, to the extent as it has effects
felt by individuals4'-then a right fairly requires a remedy.42 As Daryl Levinson
35. See Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It
Changed, and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 138-39 (2012).
36. Id. at 149-62.
37. Id. at 192.
38. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 4, at 117.
39. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success ofBivens Litigation and Its Consequences
for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 842 (2010) ("The data suggest that if
Bivens claims survive [the sua sponte dismissal of frivolous claims], their rate of success is
somewhere in between the previously reported success rates for prisoner civil rights litigation and
nonprisoner civil rights litigation."); see also id. at 833-36, 843-46 (describing the study's
methodology for determining what constituted a Bivens case and what qualified as success).
Reinert examined filings in New York (Eastern and Southern Districts), Texas (Southern District),
Pennsylvania (Eastern District), and Illinois (Northern District) from 2001 to 2003. Id. at 832.
40. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). There may of course be other ways of ensuring that the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights are enforced. One can imagine a comprehensive administrative system devoted
to preserving individual constitutional rights and remediating breaches by government employees.
Such an approach might even lead to more consistent remedies for individuals and lower violation
rates among federal actors. So requiring some remedial options does not necessarily mean requiring
damages actions. Still, in our adversarial, individualist system of rights enforcement, damages
actions are the natural choice.
41. American pragmatism was perhaps the philosophical tradition that most clearly
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has argued, if a right is defined by its existence in the world, then it not only
requires, but is, in fact, defined by its remedy: "Rights are dependent on
remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their scope,
shape, and very existence.,, 43 The basic idea is not new in American law-it
appeared in Marbury v. Madison,' which itself quoted Blackstone for the
proposition that "'it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal
right, there is also a legal remedy.., whenever that right is invaded."'
45
Alternatively, one can choose to see rights as pure ideas with no necessary
worldly existence: noumenal, extrasensory forms. But insofar as rights in a
democracy are seen to inhere in individuals and to be guaranteed by the
government, this view creates a dilemma. If rights are only abstractions to which
governments profess allegiance and not facts on the ground subject to
enforcement and remediation, it becomes difficult to distinguish a right from a
public relations strategy. And it becomes difficult for a government to credibly
claim to guarantee a right whose breach gives rise to no remedies.46 As Justice
Harlan noted in Bivens, constitutional rights represent "social policies.., aimed
predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of the popular
enunciated a definition of reality as that which has effects in the world, but realists of many stripes
would subscribe to this general approach. See, e.g., Charles Sanders Peirce, The Essentials of
Pragmatism, in PHILOSOPHICALWRIT1NGS OF PEIRCE 251,252 (Justus Buchler ed., 1955) ("[I]f one
can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial
of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is
absolutely nothing more in it."); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 7
(A.J. Ayer ed., D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness trans., 1922) ("The world is all that is the case.").
Perhaps the best known American theorist of rights and remedies, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, also
saw rights as defined by their effects in the world: He defined a right as something that creates a
duty in another. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED
IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 36-38 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
42. One can imagine a system in which a right's effect in the world implicated an internal
administrative law more than an individual adversarial process. See, e.g., Mashaw, Federal
Administration, supra note 33, at 1470. Our own system, however, is more focused on external
enforcement by individuals.
43. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REv.
857, 858 (1999); see also id. at 874 ("Rights are often shaped by the nature of the remedy that will
follow if the right is violated. The definition of most or all rights incorporates 'remedial'
prophylactic rules. And, perhaps most obviously, the cash value of any right is a function of the
remedial consequences attached to its violation.").
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
45. Id. at 163 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23).
46. See, e.g., David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions 6-7 (Nov. 1, 2001)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) ("[E] valuating the extent to which countries actually
uphold the rights found in their constitutions" by investigating "the gap between what rights are
guaranteed on paper and what rights are respected in practice," and concluding that those with the
largest gap between promise and worldly effect have "sham constitutions.").
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will,"'47 and it would be "at least anomalous" if the very entity restrained were
also the only one allowed to create remedies for its own lack of restraint.4" For
Justice Harlan, the Bivens remedy rested on the premise that foxes are not the
only acceptable guards for henhouses.49
While Bivens actions are not the only way constitutional guarantees can be
vindicated, they fit both the history of constitutional rights vindication in
America and the individualist approach to rights enforcement that our adversarial
system fosters. And they fulfill a primary criterion for recognizing a right:
providing a remedy for its violation.5"
D. Article Outline
In what follows, I first trace the development of special factors analysis in the
Supreme Court, from its origin as vague, off-hand dictum, to its culmination into
a standard inquiry about congressional will. Part II presents, in some detail, how
Bivens itself introduced the special factors, and then progresses through the
Supreme Court's several stages of subsequent special factors analyses. Moving
on to the federal courts of appeal, Part HI shows that the common understanding
of Bivens's central problem as one of the separation of judicial from legislative
powers has led to a fairly standard, though never fully articulated, approach.
Almost uniformly, circuit courts treat the special factors analysis as an inquiry
into whether Congress has indicated that it wishes to preclude Bivens remedies.
Part V turns to outliers. One kind of outlier applies special factors analysis
like everybody else, by looking for indications of legislative preclusion, but
mistakenly finds congressional intent where none could have been implied. That
kind of outlier stays within the parameters of the accepted doctrine and follows
the special factor rationale, but it comes to unreasonable conclusions. The
second kind of outlier deviates more seriously from the mainstream by failing to
recognize that special factors analysis inquires into legislative will. The second
kind of outlier turns Bivens's separation of powers concern on its head by
focusing instead on the Executive. Arar v. Ashcroft,5 a Second Circuit case,
exemplifies this mistake, and I examine it in detail to demonstrate how it deviates
from the Supreme Court's established form of special factors analysis and
47. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,404
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). One could point also to evidence suppression and statute
invalidation.
48. Id. at 403. In this passage, Justice Harlan lumped together the executive and the
legislative branches as the popular government restrained by constitutional guarantees. Later
Bivens jurisprudence made this distinction more clearly.
49. Bivens remedies are usually applied against executive officers, while it is Congress that
creates the remedies. Justice Harlan's concurrence read the Constitution as restraining the will of
both political branches. Id.
50. See Thomas R. Phillips, The ConstitutionalRights to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309,
1310-14 (2003).
51. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (rehearing en banc).
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misconstrues its underlying separation of powers concern. I also show that what
the Arar court thought were Bivens special factors are, in fact, separate concerns
that come with legal doctrines of their own, and I discuss how those concerns
would have looked if the court had used the appropriate legal frameworks.
Finally, the conclusion synthesizes the elements of special factors analysis
generally shared among the circuit courts and reviews some of the stakes of
getting it right.
As the Supreme Court has moved away from recognizing implied rights of
action generally, it has also expressed ambivalence about the wisdom and the
extent of Bivens. At least two sitting justices have strongly implied that Bivens
was a mistake.52 But the Supreme Court-those two Justices included-has also
reserved for itself "the prerogative of overruling its own decisions," cautioning
others against treating its own moods and apparent preferences as law.53 In this
vein, it has instructed lower courts to "follow [a] case which directly controls"
even when that case "appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions."" Bivens actions remain viable; this Article gives lower courts a
principled way to assess them.
H. SPECIAL FACTORS ANALYSIS AT THE SUPREME COURT
A. Special Factors in Bivens
Bivens famously held that a "violation of [the Fourth Amendment guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures] by a federal agent acting under color
of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages" against the individual
agent.55 Webster Bivens was allowed to sue for damages, in their personal
capacities,56 the federal agents who had entered his home without a warrant and
52. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537,568 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Bivens
is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of
action." (quoting Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
concurring))). As my brief historical discussion indicates, of course, the Bivens decision came in
the wake of the Court's exercise of its common-law powers to expand official immunities.
53. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,484 (1989).
54. Id.; see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).
55. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971).
56. As Reinert explains:
Personal capacity claims are brought against government officials individually, almost
always for damages. In theory, defendants who are found liable in their personal
capacity are responsible for paying damages out of their own pockets, although the
federal government, like most states and municipalities, usually indemnifies employees
for the damages awarded in constitutional tort actions.... Official capacity claims, by
contrast, are brought nominally against government officials, but typically seek
injunctive relief against a government entity that would otherwise be immune from suit
in federal court.
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arrested him.57 Rejecting the defendants' contention that Bivens should sue for
tort in state court, the Court held that a federal right should be vindicated in
federal court." In a seeming afterthought, the Bivens opinion added that "[t]he
present case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress,"59 that is, in the absence of a congressionally
created remedy.
Bivens did not elaborate on what it meant by special factors; it just gave a
couple of examples.6" Later cases would develop the idea more fully. Looking
closely at this original presentation of special factors helps us see both how much
the analysis has changed since Bivens was decided, and how its animating
concerns have remained similar.
In the first example, United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California,6 the
Court had refused to create a new cause of action to allow the government to sue
a corporation whose employee had injured a soldier.62 Rejecting a tort law
analogy, the Court concluded that the case primarily raised issues of the "federal
fiscal policy" of expenditures on injured soldiers.63 Tort-inflicted costs were
hardly new, the Court reasoned, yet Congress, "the custodian of the national
purse,"' which knew how to "take steps to prevent interference with federal
Reinert, supra note 39, at 811 n.2 (citations omitted).
57. Pfander notes that although the Court assumed Bivens's innocence, it is not clear that
police lacked probable cause for the arrest, and it is likely that the warrantless entry and arrest were
lawful under New York law at the time. Pfander, The Story ofBivens, supra note 2, at 290,292-93.
The larger point, of course, remains undisturbed: The Court was deciding only whether Bivens had
a cause of action against allegedly unconstitutional treatment, not whether the officers had in fact
acted unconstitutionally, nor whether New York law countenanced unconstitutional action.
58. Specifically, the Court explained that, were Bivens to sue in state court, the Fourth
Amendment would not preserve an affirmative right; but, it would only "limit the extent to which
the agents could defend ... their actions [as] a valid exercise of federal power," leaving them to
"stand before the state law merely as private individuals" if they could be "shown to have violated"
it. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390-91. But officers are not, the Court emphasized, merely private
individuals: The power of the federal officer to enter a private home and enact an arrest differs
from the authority of a private individual, and a person's ability to resist trespass by a private
individuals differs from his ability to resist trespass by a federal agent-resistance that may itself
be criminal. Id. at 391-95. Moreover, the Court stated, since the rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment are federal and do not depend on the provisions of state law, it made no sense to rely
on state law to remedy their violation. Id. at 392-93. Finally, regarding its recognition of a remedy
for Bivens, the Court noted that "[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy
for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." Id. at 395.
59. Id. at 396. The standard spelling of"counseling" has apparently changed since 1971, and
it appears spelled both with one "I" and with two in the case law.
60. Id.
61. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
62. Id. at314.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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funds," had not devised a cause of action for that situation.65 Creating a cause of
action would improperly supplant congressional authority with an executive
"fiscal and regulatory polic[y]." 66 Standard Oil rebuffed the Executive's request
that the Court step outside its normal role as "arbiter[] between citizen[]" parties,
each equally powerless to create a cause of action.67 The Court reasoned that
since the federal government could, itself, create the cause of action it requested,
it was inappropriate for the Court to do so. 6' Bivens approvingly referred to
Standard Oil's refusal to intervene in "federal fiscal policy"69 and its conclusion
that "the United States [was] the party plaintiff to the suit. And the United States
has the power at any time to create the liability."7" Bivens also cited, but did not
discuss, United States v. Gilman,7 where the Court declined to extend common-
law respondeat superior indemnification to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
when the federal government sued its own employee for indemnification.7" The
Gilman Court focused on Congress's expertise in the area, stating "[t]he relations
between the United States and its employees have presented a myriad of
problems with which the Congress over the years has dealt."73
Bivens did not explain what constituted special factors in these cases.
However, the cases suggest that the Court declined to do for the other branches
what they ought to do for themselves-deferring to congressional authority over
the federal purse and deferring to congressional expertise in the area of federal
employment.
Bivens's second example of a situation involving special factors was
Wheeldin v. Wheeler,74 in which the recipient of a House Un-American Activities
Committee subpoena sued a committee investigator for improperly using his
subpoena power.75 The Court held that the allegations did not constitute a
65. Id. at 315-16.
66. Id. at 314-15.
67. Id. at 316.
68. Id. at 316-17. Although Standard Oil started out distinguishing the legislative from the
executive branch, this later passage lumped them together. At the same time, Standard Oil also
assumed that courts could themselves create remedies, especially in "the constitutional area." Id.
at 313.
69. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,396
(1971) (quoting Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 311).
70. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 316).
71. 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
72. Id. at 509-13.
73. Id. at 509.
74. 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
75. Id. at 648. Alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, the recipient claimed
that the investigator was not authorized by the committee to subpoena him specifically, but had
instead filled in, without receiving properly delegated authority to do so, a blank subpoena signed
by the committee chairman, and that the statute authorizing the House Un-American Activities
Committee to subpoena witnesses was itself unconstitutional. Id. at 648-49. He further alleged that
the receipt of the subpoena, which was delivered to his workplace, caused him to lose his job and
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constitutional claim because "there was neither a search nor a seizure of him. He
was neither arrested nor detained .... In short, the facts alleged do not establish
a violation of the Fourth Amendment."76 As with any inquiry into whether a
plaintiff has stated "a claim upon which" the relief demanded "can be granted,""
this example merely required that the remedy fit the right: Constitutional
damages require a constitutional violation.78 Later cases in the Bivens line adopt
this requirement, not as a special factor, but as a simple element of the claim.79
Finally, Bivens noted that congressional action might obviate a constitutional
damages remedy.8" Rejecting the argument that a judge-made remedy was
appropriate only if "necessary to enforce" a constitutional right,8 the Court
reasoned that the question was "merely whether petitioner ... is entitled to
redress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism normally available
in the federal courts."82  Presuming this normal availability, the Court
furthermore found "no explicit congressional declaration" that people in Mr.
Bivens's situation "may not recover money damages... but must instead be
remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress." 3 In
Bivens, overcoming the presumption that constitutional damages were available
required an "explicit congressional declaration" both making such a remedy
unavailable and requiring the petitioner to pursue "another remedy [that was]
equally effective in the view of Congress." 4 If Congress barred a damages
remedy and directed harmed individuals to some other relief that it viewed as an
equivalent to damages, the Court should pause and consider that fact before
deciding whether to grant a damages remedy.8
While Bivens did not label this third situation as a special factor, its concerns
are congruent with those of the first. Together, the two provide the enduring
rationale behind special factors analysis: a deference to congressional authority
and expertise over the federal budget, federal employees, and the creation of
remedies.
to be stigmatized, leading to economic and emotional damages. Id. at 648.
76. Id. at 649-50.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
78. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978).
79. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979) ("Moreover, a plaintiff seeking a
damages remedy under the Constitution must first demonstrate that his constitutional rights have
been violated. We do not hold that every tort by a federal official may be redressed in damages.").
80. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971)
81. Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. As discussed below, the term "counselling hesitation" has come to mean something more
like "prohibiting" a damages remedy. Id. at 396. This later meaning, however, which is the product
of decades of case law, is hard to read back into Bivens itself--"counsel," after all, does not usually
mean command, and "hesitation" does not usually mean cessation.
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B. Explicit Preclusion (1979-1983)
In the decade following Bivens, the Court explained that there were "two
situations" in which a Bivens claim "may be defeated": when "defendants
demonstrate 'special factors counselling hesitation,"' 86 and when they "show that
Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be
a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective. 8 ' At this stage, the special factor label primarily applied to the
86. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
87. Id. at 18-19 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396). This Article focuses specifically on the
development of the special factors analysis, rather than on the development ofBivensjurisprudence
as a whole. Scholarship dealing with the remedy more broadly tends to present its history as one
of a brief initial decade of expansion, during which, in addition to Bivens's initial recognition of
constitutional damages for Fourth Amendment violations, the Court recognized remedies for
violations of Fifth Amendment due process rights to equal treatment for women and Eighth
Amendment rights regarding medical attention while incarcerated. See id; Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 245-48 (1979). After 1980, however, the Court's tide turned against Bivens, and from
then on, Bivens cases primarily declined to recognize, rather than expand, individuals' remedies
against federal employees. In 1983, the Court held unanimously that military personnel had no
Bivens claim against their superior officers for racial discrimination. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296, 304 (1983). Additionally, and again unanimously, the Court held that federal employees had
no Bivens claim against superiors who violated their First Amendment free speech rights. Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-89(1983). In 1988, the Court declined to recognize that people wrongly
denied social security disability benefits had a Bivens due process claim under the Fifth
Amendment. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425,428-29 (1988). In 1994, the Court held
that only individuals, not agencies, could be sued under Bivens. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,
485-86 (1994). And in 2001 it held, analogously, that a private corporation was not liable under
Bivens suit either. Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). In 2007, the
Court declined to recognize Bivens actions for violations of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause,
although it did not unequivocally deny Bivens remedies to all takings claims. Wilkie v. Robbins,
551 U.S. 537 (2007). And most recently, in Minneci v. Pollard, the Court held that employees of
a privately ran federal prison were not subject to Bivens suits because state law provided alternative
remedies. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012); see also Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N.
Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Refraining Bivens After Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2013), available at ssrn.com/abstract=2042175.
Bivensjurisprudence is often described as initially expanding to include certain constitutional
provisions and then ceasing to expand to others. It is not clear, however, why, if a damages remedy
is available for violations of some constitutionally guaranteed individual rights, it should not be
presumptively available for all. After all, the Constitution does not guarantee some individual
rights less vigorously than others. (Instead, it would make more sense to draw the line at the
Constitution's structuring and constraint of government action, which does not guarantee individual
rights.) This history is perhaps better interpreted as successive determinations about the kinds of
situations-the kinds of relations between plaintiffs and defendants-that Bivens may encompass,
rather than about the particular constitutional provisions it can vindicate.
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question of whether defendants "enjoy[ed] such independent status in our
constitutional scheme... that judicially created remedies against them might be
inappropriate.""
Thus in Carlson v. Green, the Court determined that prison guards receive
no constitutional protection from suit beyond qualified immunity, which ensures
that a lawsuit does not "inhibit their efforts to perform their official duties." 9
Although in Davis v. Passman9° the defendant's role as a former Congressman
was a "special concern[] counseling hesitation," the Court determined that his
immunity from suit for "actions taken in the course of his official conduct" was
sufficiently addressed by qualified immunity and "the protections ... [of] the
Speech or Debate Clause" of the Constitution.9 Although the defendant's
unusual position in Davis counseled hesitation, it did not preclude a remedy.
The Court also continued to assess whether an "explicit congressional
declaration" precluded constitutional damages.92 Davis, for instance, reasoned
that a plaintiff excluded from explicit statutory remedies must have a
constitutional damages remedy.93 The Davis plaintiff was a congressional
employee not subject to Title VII protections.94 The Court determined that there
was "no evidence ... that Congress meant... to foreclose alternative remedies
... . On the contrary, [the statute] leaves undisturbed whatever remedies
petitioner might otherwise possess." 95 Similarly, Carlson held that the plaintiff
inmate's ability to sue the government under the FTCA did not preclude his
constitutional damages suit against the individuals who injured him.96 On the
contrary, the Court concluded that the Senate Report accompanying the 1974
amendments to the FTCA "made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and
Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action. 97
During this stage of Bivens jurisprudence, in sum, the Court presumed that
a constitutional damages remedy was available unless (1) the defendant was so
"independent" within the "constitutional scheme" that judicial remedies against
88. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (holding that an inmate's ability to bring an
action under the FTCA did not preclude a Bivens suit for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights
and addressing what law governed such an action by an inmate's estate).
89. Id.
90. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
91. Id. at246.
92. Id. at 246-47 (internal citations omitted).
93. Id. at 245.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2006) (protecting only employees in the competitive civil
service).
95. Davis, 442 U.S. at 247. As a non-competitive employee (that is, not a regular civil
service employee but someone hired and fired by the Congressman), the plaintiff had no statutory
or administrative remedy. Id. at 247 n.26. And because the defendant Congressman had since left
office, the plaintiff could seek no equitable relief either. Id. at 231.
96. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980); see also Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 4,
at 132-33.
97. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20; see also Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 4.
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him would upset the federal government's balance of powers;98 or (2) Congress
had explicitly provided some other, equally effective, remedy.9 While either of
these factors could preclude a Bivens remedy, only the first was explicitly called
a special factor. The second still constituted its own inquiry into the extent of
"affirmative action by Congress."'0° Later cases, in contrast, began to treat the
existence of congressional remedies as a special factor as well. 1 '
C. Implicit Preclusion (1983-2007)
Special factors analysis changed dramatically over the following decades.
The Court abandoned its interest in a defendant's place in the constitutional
scheme and in the power differences between the parties. It focused instead on
the separation of powers and relative institutional competence between the
legislative and the judicial branches. Instead of requiring an explicit legislative
substitute for constitutional damages, the Court began to look for implicit
indications of legislative preference. The Court also abandoned the presumption
of constitutional damages, turning instead to case-by-case evaluations. Instead
of a consideration that counseled hesitation, special factors became an obstacle
that commanded cessation.10 2
Two unanimous 1983 decisions started these new trends. One, Bush v.
Lucas,0 3 declined to recognize a Bivens remedy for a federal employee, holding
that the "elaborate, comprehensive scheme" protecting such employees, within
which the plaintiff's claims were "fully cognizable," provided sufficient
recourse. l° In deferring to Congress's special authority over federal employees,
98. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19.
99. Id. at 18-19.
100. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,396
(1971).
101. See, e.g., Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d 988,991 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Implied preclusion of
a Bivens action can be found when defendants can demonstrate the existence of 'special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."' (quoting Schweiker v.
Chillicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988))).
102. There is another, more legal realist, way to tell this same history. Simply put, after the
expansive rights-creation of the Warren years, the Supreme Court limited and constrained
constitutional damages just as it limited and constrained other rights created or enhanced in the
1960s and 1970s. Though I focus on a more doctrinally intricate explanation, I also agree with the
legal realist version of the history: The two are not mutually contradictory. What I explain in
shorthand is that the legal realist approach looks to the result-the contraction, or at least the
stopped expansion, of rights. I look to how the Court gets there--drawing on preemption analysis
to create a somewhat analogous approach at the federal level, it retained its focus on the separation
ofjudicial and legislative powers.
103. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
104. Id. at 385-86. The plaintiff in Bush v. Lucas was a NASA employee who had been
demoted for publicly criticizing the agency. Id. at 369. He first sought administrative remedies
available to him under the civil service laws, including a final layer of review, completed several
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Bush was in line with Gilman, one of the cases cited by Bivens when it
introduced special factors, which refused to intrude on the federal employee
relationship.10 5 But Bush added something new as well: implicit preclusion.
Congress, the Court stated, "may ... indicate its intent, by statutory language, by
clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the statutory remedy itself."1 °6 After
Bush, courts were responsible for discerning an implicit congressional desire to
preclude constitutional damages. Such implicit preclusion would decisively
constitute a special factor.
In this same process, the Court abandoned Bivens's concern with power
differentials between the parties and focused instead on the relative institutional
competence of different branches of government. The Court refused to
"augment[]" Congress's "elaborate remedial system... constructed step by step,
with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations" with a judge-made
remedy." 7 Deferring to congressional competence in the federal employee realm,
Bush also compared the institutional competence of Congress and the
Executive.' Discussing Standard Oil, which was the original example of
special factors relied on in Bivens, Bush explained the Court has "refused to
create a damages remedy" because such a remedy would have been "the
instrument for ... establishing the federal fiscal and regulatory policies which
the ... executive.. . thinks should prevail" but which was, in fact, for Congress
to determine.109 Bush thus emphasized that the executive branch may have policy
preferences, but it is Congress, not the judiciary, that implements them in laws.
The other 1983 decision marked an even more radical change in the special
factors analysis. Chappell v. Wallace 10 announced for the first time that "a
[Bivens] remedy will not be available when 'special factors counselling
hesitation' are present." '' This announcement was styled as a description, not
a holding.1 2 Whether the very existence of special factors precludes a Bivens
remedy or merely gives rise to a more careful inquiry on the part of courts-as
it had in pre-Chappell cases-does not yet have a definitive answer. But,
years after the demotion, in which an agency review board recommended his reinstatement with
back pay; NASA followed the recommendation. Id. at 371. While this final administrative appeal
was pending, Bush sued the superiors who had demoted him for violating his First Amendment
right to free speech. Id.
105. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
106. Bush, 462 U.S. at 378.
107. Id. at 388.
108. Id. at 379.
109. Id. (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 314 (1947)).
110. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
111. Id. at 298 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)).
112. The Chappell opinion asserted that "[t]he Court, in Bivens and its progeny, has expressly
cautioned" that special factors would have this preclusive effect, id., but as my discussion analysis
demonstrates, this was not accurate. In fact, before Chappell, Bivens and its progeny treated special
factors as something that a court should consider, not something that should bring a court up short.
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building on Chappell's confident proclamation, courts lean toward preclusion. 3
Chappell also introduced what might be termed a field preclusion approach
to special factors. In Chappell, military personnel sued their superiors for
discrimination on the basis of race. 114 Chappell declined to recognize a remedy
for military servicepeople against military superiors by analogy to the Feres
doctrine, which exempts the federal government from suit under the FTCA for
harms sustained "incident to [military] service."' '" The Feres doctrine has been
justified through the requirements of military discipline and its necessity to
national security." 6 Chappell further emphasized Congress's plenary control
over, and wide-ranging regulation of, military affairs, which had effectively
occupied the field of remedy creation in the military context."' "[T]he unique
disciplinary structure of the [m]ilitary [e]stablishment and Congress' activity in
the field constitute 'special factors' making a Bivens remedy "inappropriate."" I"
The Court thus read congressional intent off of congressional silence on the
issue, and interpreted its own authority with reference to the arena occupied by
Congress. 1"
The Court did not explicitly acknowledge the changes these cases wrought
in the special factors analysis, but treated them as mere explications of an
existing approach. Of course, unacknowledged changes to existing doctrine are
not unusual. They are, rather, how our precedential system of law-making works.
In this case, however, the changes wrought by the 1983 cases may have been so
113. Compare, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574 (2d Cir. 2009) (asserting that all that
is required to preclude a Bivens suit is a single factor counseling hesitation, and concluding that the
"relevant threshold" for preclusion is thus "remarkably low"), with id. at 583 (Sack, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he applicable test is not whether 'special factors' exist, but
whether after 'paying particular heed to' them, a Bivens remedy should be recognized with respect
to at least some allegations in the complaint."). It is especially difficult to reconcile Chappell's
characterization of special factors with Davis, where a Bivens action was approved despite the
acknowledged existence of a special factor. Chappell did not purport to overrule Davis.
114. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297.
115. Id. at 299 (alteration in original) (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138
(1950)).
116. The reasoning of Chappell was extended in United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669
(1987), which held that Bivens was unavailable not only to subordinates suing their military
superiors, but in any case that implicated military discipline where the injury occurred incident to
military service. Id. at 683-84. Stanley effectively equated the Bivens special factor analysis in
cases implicating the military with Feres's 'incident to service' analysis. Id. at 678-84.
117. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299.
118. Id. at 304.
119. This approach, of course, contrasts sharply with that of Davis, in which the Court held
that the omission of the injured party from a remedial scheme left her with access to any otherwise
existing remedies. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); see supra note 79 and accompanying
text. It also pairs oddly with Bush, handed down the same day, which denied a Bivens remedy
precisely because the injured party was included in the remedial scheme. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367 (1983); see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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subtle that even some members of the Court did not recognize them at the time.
These changes would be cemented five years later in Schweiker v.
Chilicky.12 Unlike Bush and Chappell, the plaintiffs in Chilicky were not federal
employees. They were disabled people who had been wrongfully denied federal
disability benefits under a program that put pressure on administrators to
terminate ongoing disability claims.'2 ' Through administrative redress
procedures, their benefits had been reinstated, with back pay. 22 The plaintiffs
claimed, however, that because they depended on these benefits to sustain
themselves, restitution and back pay alone could not remedy the damage caused
by going without basic life necessities for months on end. 23 They also argued
that administrative process could not address the constitutional violations of
administrators "adopt[ing] illegal policies that led to the wrongful termination of
benefits by state agencies." ' 4  Although the plaintiffs were not federal
employees, the Court concluded that the case "cannot reasonably be
distinguished from Bush v. Lucas"125 because the Social Security Act provided
a comprehensive scheme governing social security benefits. 26 Because this
"suggest[ed] that Congress ha[d] provided what it consider[ed] adequate
remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course
of [the program's] administration," Bivens was not available even if the scheme
did not provide remedies for the particular kind of wrong at issue.1
27
Chilicky cemented the new special factors implicit preclusion approach,
stating that "the concept of 'special factors counselling hesitation in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress' has proved to include an appropriate judicial
120. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
121. Id. at417.
122. Id.
123. Id. at418.
124. Id. The opinion details a congressional investigation of the Social Security Agency's
Continuing Disability Review (CDR), under which claimants who appealed the denial of benefits
were denied benefits pending administrative review. Administrators reviewing disability claims had
been pressured to deny them even though "benefits were too often being improperly terminated by
state agencies, only to be reinstated by a federal administrative law judge." Id. at 415. The inquiry
found that the program had had disastrous consequences, improperly denying support to "hundreds
of thousands of truly disabled Americans." Id. at 416 (quoting 130 CONG. REC. 26000, 13234
(1984) (statement of Sen. Moynihan)). "There is little doubt," Chilicky concluded, "that CDR led
to many hardships and injuries that could never be adequately compensated." Id. at 417. Chilicky's
named plaintiff, for instance, "was in the hospital recovering from open-heart surgery when he was
informed that his heart condition was no longer disabling." Id. at 418. The Chilicky plaintiffs
alleged that administrators had knowingly failed to use public and equal criteria to judge their
claims, ignored evidence of their disabilities, selected biased doctors to perform review, and
imposed quotas requiring that a certain number of people be denied the continuation of benefits
regardless of the actual state of their disability. Id. at 418-19.
125. Id at 425.
126. Id. at 424-25.
127. Id. at 423.
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deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent. '128
After Chilicky, courts focused less on the sufficiency and explicitness of existing
remedies and more on the simple question of whether Congress had "enacted a
comprehensive ... scheme governing the area involved," and on "Congress' [s]
expertise and authority in the field in question. 1 29 If there was a comprehensive
scheme, then a "failure to provide a damages remedy for constitutional
violations" would be interpreted as "deliberate rather than inadvertent." 30 This
effectively reversed the earlier presumption that constitutional damages would
be available in situations where Congress had "heavily regulated a certain subject
... but ha[d] said nothing about a right of action for constitutional violations." '31
Dissenting from Chilicky, Justice Brennan, who had written the opinions in
Bivens, Davis, and Carlson and had joined the opinions in Bush and Chappell,
acknowledged for the first time the changes wrought by the 1983 cases. "I find
it inconceivable," he wrote, "that Congress meant by mere silence to bar all
redress for such injuries."'' 32  There were two important distinctions, he
explained, between the Bush and Chappell situations and the one in Chilicky.'33
First, the remedial schemes at issue in Bush and Chappell provided relief for
constitutional violations. 34 In Chilicky, "by stark contrast," the disability
"recipients cannot even raise constitutional challenges to agency action.., and
... can recover no consequential damages whatsoever."' 35 Second, military
personnel and federal employees stood in a unique relation to the legislature:
Congress has plenary power over the first, and "enjoys a special expertise"
regarding the second.'36 It was the unique relationship of Congress to the
military and the civil service, not simple "congressional authority over a given
subject," that were the special factors in Chappell and Bush.'37 But Congress has
no special relationship to, and no special expertise with, disabled people and their
benefits. It was "simply competent to legislate in [that] area" as in any other.13
As Justice Brennan's dissent demonstrates, Chilicky entrenched the new style
of special factors analysis introduced in Chappell and Bush. No longer would the
Court require an explicit legislative substitute to preclude constitutional damages,
and no longer would it even require Congress to have any special expertise in, or
relationship to, the subject or people covered by a remedial scheme. This new
approach greatly expanded the range of situations in which courts would find
Bivens remedies precluded. At the same time, the new approach rested on the
128. Id.
129. Jones v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 948 F.2d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1991).
130. Id.
131. McIntosh v. Turner, 861 F.2d 524, 525 (8th Cir. 1988).
132. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 432 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 436-42.
134. Id. at 436-37.
135. Id. at 437.
136. Id. at441.
137. Id. at 442.
138. Id.
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same foundation as the previous one: The Court still looked to Congress to
provide an alternative remedial scheme or to delegate the provision of such a
scheme to an administrative agency. The separation of powers issue at the heart
of Bivens remained the separation of judicial from legislative authority.
D. Manageability (2007)
One final case added a new concern to Bivens decisions while retaining the
components of special factors analysis. Wilkie v. Robbins'39 has caused
considerable confusion, but did not disturb the existing framework for special
factors preemption analysis. Wilkie introduced for the first time what it called
a "familiar sequence" for determining whether a Bivens remedy should be
available. 4 ' First, a court should ask "whether any alternative, existing process
for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the [j]udicial
[b]ranch to refrain fromproviding a new and freestanding remedy in damages."'.4 1
This first step harks back to older cases' requirement that Congress provide some
adequate alternative remedy if Bivens is to be precluded. If no such process
exists, Wilkie's second step requires a court to "make the kind of remedial
determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular
heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing
a new kind of federal litigation." '142 Appending special factors analysis as a
subsection of the common law determination in this way can lead to the
confusion of courts that do not realize that each inquiry has its own
jurisprudential tradition. A careful reading of Wilkie, however, reveals that the
special factors analysis remains the same as it was before the Court announced
its decision.
In Wilkie, a landowner sued agents of the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) for trying to force him to grant an easement over his land in abrogation
of his Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for a taking of property.'43
The previous owner had granted the BLM an easement, but BLM officials
neglected to record the grant; under local law, the easement was therefore not
passed on to the new landowner.'" Robbins, the plaintiff, alleged that when he
refused to simply grant the easement with no compensation, BLM officials
139. 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
140. Id. at 550.
141. Id. (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
142. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bush, 462 U.S. at 378).
143. Id. at 541. Wilkie declined to recognize a cause of action for a Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause violation, but it did not categorically exclude the Takings Clause from Bivens's ambit.
Rather, it found Bivens inappropriate in that particular case. Id. at 562. Wilkie did not, for instance,
question, or even mention, a Fourth Circuit case that recognized a Takings Clause Bivens remedy.
See Dunbar Corp. v. Lindsey, 905 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1990) (recognizing a constitutional damages
remedy under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause for a private company with a possessory
interest in property taken over by the government).
144. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 542-43.
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launched a multi-year campaign to force him to do so or to force him out of
business. 145 The campaign included both acts that were themselves illegal (such
as trespass) and acts that were otherwise legal but that were undertaken for an
illegal purpose (such as selectively refusing to grant Robbins standard permits
necessary to run his business). 146
After determining that Robbins had no statutory or administrative remedy, 1
47
Wilkie went on to the new second step of the Bivens analysis, weighing the
interests at stake while remaining cognizant of the possibility of special
factors.148 This part of Wilkie149 has sometimes been read to be about special
factors, but the opinion itself did not purport to find any special factors. In fact,
it never mentioned the term again. This makes sense, as the Court expressly
found that no remedial scheme encompassed the wrongs of which Robbins
complained but did not find that Congress, in failing to legislate remedies for
these kinds of harms, had purposely excluded plaintiffs like Robbins from access
to remedies.15 ° Thus, the Court's analysis showed that the existing requirements
for finding special factors had not been met.
Rather than rely on special factors, Wilkie upheld the dismissal of Robbins's
claims on two grounds. First, the Court concluded that allowing the suit would
enable a flood of lawsuits from people disgruntled with their interactions with
bureaucrats.1 51 Justice Ginsburg's dissent called this a new kind of "special
factor."' 52 But, as a prudential concern, the floodgate argument is better seen as
part of the weighing of interests "that is appropriate for a common-law
tribunal."'53 There is, as Justice Ginsburg herself pointed out, no precedent for
the floodgate argument in a special factors analysis.'54 And the opinion itself did
145. Id. at 543.
146. Id. at 543-47.
147. Id. at 554 (summarizing the argument for granting a Bivens remedy as "the inadequacy
of discrete, incident-by-incident remedies").
148. Id.
149. Id. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 555 (majority opinion).
151. While "[i]t is true that the Government is no ordinary landowner," the Court concluded,
allowing constitutional damages against agents acting on the government-as-landowner's behalf
"would invite claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental action affecting property interests,
from negotiating tax claim settlements to enforcing Occupational Safety and Health Administration
regulations." Id. at 558, 561.
152. Id. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 550 (majority opinion) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
154. Id. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (calling the floodgates argument "a special factor
counseling hesitation quite unlike any we have recognized before"). Indeed, Bivens itself had
rejected a floodgates argument without suggesting that it might be a special factor. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388,391 n.4(1971) ("In estimating
the magnitude of any such 'avalanche [of new cases],' it is worth noting that a survey of comparable
actions against state officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 found only 53 reported cases in 17 years
(1951-1967) that survived a motion to dismiss. Increasing this figure by 900% to allow for
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not refer to it as such. Rather, the floodgate argument appeared in the part of the
opinion devoted to common-law weighing of relevant interests.
Second, the Court concluded that a Bivens remedy would force courts to
draw hard-to-see lines, having to distinguish between bureaucratic conduct that
zealously pursues the public interest and that which oversteps zeal and violates
constitutional rights. 55 Such line-drawing would tax the Court's institutional
competence because Robbins challenged "actions that, on their own, fall within
the [g]overnment's enforcement power," and because he challenged a multi-year
accrual of pressure rather than discrete acts. 56 The Court lacked the competence
to make a remedy in this case because of "the elusiveness of a limiting principle
for Robbins's claim."'57 In that context, the Court concluded, "'Congress is in
a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of
litigation' against those who act on the public's behalf."'
This second ground concludes that courts are ill-equipped to deal with claims
against long-term campaigns of largely lawful action taken with unlawful intent:
It is simply too difficult to define what the violation is. Wilkie's second ground
thus says less about whether a particular remedy is appropriate and more about
a court's ability to recognize a particular kind of claim. The problem with
Robbins's suit was not that it would be inappropriate to provide a remedy for a
Fifth Amendment wrong but that it was unclear how to define, or even identify,
the wrong that had been committed against him.159 The Wilkie opinion does not
call this a special factor. If anything, this definitional issue harks back to
Bivens's requirement that constitutional damages remedies be given only where
plaintiffs successfully allege violations of a constitutional magnitude-more a
threshold pleading requirement than a special factor.
The two grounds on which the Court resolved Wilkie, then, were both aimed
at making claims practically and conceptually manageable. Practically,
recognizing a remedy should not give rise to a large and unnecessary amount of
new litigation. Conceptually, a remedy should be recognized only for injuries
that fit within the normal parameters of a legal claim. Wilkie did not discuss the
relative authority of the courts and the legislature, and it never doubted that the
Court had the authority to recognize a remedy. Rather, it doubted the Court's
ability to handle the remedy it could create. 6 This concern fits more
comfortably into the common-law weighing of interests that Wilkie introduced
than the separation of powers concerns of special factors analysis. Wilkie, in
sum, found that intra-judicial concerns raise sufficient grounds to bar a Bivens
increases in rate and unreported cases, every federal district judge could expect to try one such case
every 13 years." (internal citation omitted)).
155. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 562.
156. Id. at 560.
157. Id. at561 n.il.
158. Id. at 562 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983)).
159. Id. at 561 n.11.
160. Id. at 562.
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remedy.161 It did not turn to the inter-branch concerns that special factors
implicate and, in the end, simply did not perform a special factors analysis. It
may be that the Court will eventually subsume the special factors analysis into
Wilkie's common-law weighing, but if that is the case, the Court has not made
any such movement clear. Thus, the special factors analysis after Wilkie remains
unchanged.
III. CONSOLIDATING SPECIAL FACTORS ANALYSIS IN THE COURTS OF APPEAL
Part II showed how special factors emerged in Bivens as an inchoate
reference, loosely oriented around ensuring that judicial remedies did not
encroach on the prerogatives of Congress. The concept gained definition over
the ensuing decades, coming into sharper focus in the 1980s, when the Court
shaped its inquiry into one of congressional will, with techniques drawn from
preemption analysis. When Congress explicitly provided alternative remedies,
legislatively occupied the field, or implicitly indicated that no additional
remedies should be provided, the Court refused to recognize a remedy. Because
the Court developed this approach over only a few cases, the special factors
analysis at the Supreme Court level retains somewhat vague outlines. The latest
case to touch upon it, Wilkie, mentioned special factors without actually utilizing
the concept. 62
The Federal Courts of Appeal have lent coherence and specificity to these
somewhat vague outlines by keeping the focus of special factors analysis
consistently on congressional will. In the past two decades, the circuit courts
have consistently based the availability of Bivens remedies on whether a
comprehensive statutory remedial scheme addressed the situation at issue. While
the courts have been consistent in how they actually approach special factors,
courts of appeal have described the analysis in a variety of ways. Some
explicitly look to remedies available by statute. Others say that they consider the
categories of parties in the case. Still others rely on the simple fact that some law
touches on the case without examining whether it provides a relevant
comprehensive scheme. Sometimes courts combine these phrasings. As I
demonstrate in this Part, however, what appear as different approaches are, in
fact, merely different ways of describing the same underlying question: whether
Congress has indicated that it wishes the judiciary not to create remedies in a
particular situation. Sometimes explicitly, sometimes unwittingly, courts of
appeal have converged on and developed the implicit preclusion style of special
factors analysis that the Supreme Court introduced in the 1980s.
A. Self-Conscious Implicit Preclusion Analysis
Most appellate courts recognize that the special factors analysis serves to
prevent courts from treading on ground already claimed by Congress. Some
courts find it important to determine whether a statutory remedial scheme
161. Id. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
162. See supra Part II.D.
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specifically addresses constitutional violations while others do "not require a
foray into the meaningfulness of [a plaintiffs] remedies under the [statutory
scheme]," and simply "focus . . . on the comprehensive nature of the
administrative system protecting the rights of the plaintiff, as well as
Congress'[s] expertise and authority in the field in question."' 63 Generally,
courts do not ask whether the statutory scheme affords relief comparable to what
a plaintiff would have under Bivens or even whether it affords any relief at all.
The question instead is whether Congress appears to have considered the kind of
claim at issue and has indicated a preference about how to handle it.'" Courts
interpret both inclusion in, and exclusion from, a statutory remedial scheme as
a statement of congressional policy. Thus, for instance, because the statutory
remedial scheme relevant to a particular case addressed violations of
constitutional rights but did not provide damages for them, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that Congress had intended to preclude a constitutional damages
remedy. 165
A small number of statutory schemes preclude Bivens most frequently. Chief
among these is the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), which provides a complex
remedial framework for public employees. 6 6 Courts agree that Congress has
occupied the field of federal employment and find that the CSRA precludes
Bivens remedies both where it provides federal employees with redress and
where it does not. For instance, the CSRA has precluded a Bivens suit by a
federal educator, a kind of employee not covered by the full range of CSRA
protections 16' and by an employee of the federal judiciary, to whom the CSRA
163. Jones v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 948 F.2d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Feit v. Ward, 886
F.2d 848, 854-55 (7th Cir. 1989)) (providing examples from the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as
the Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits).
164. Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 2005).
165. Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 853-54 (7th Cir. 1989).
166. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5 U.S.C.). Scholarship suggests that CSRA remedies are in fact inadequate to address
constitutional claims, especially under the First Amendment. See, e.g., John F. Preis, Constitutional
Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REv. 1663, 1714 (2009) ("A recent study of First Amendment
claims by federal employees suggests that the 'administrative scheme [utilized in such cases] is not
vindicating the First Amendment... rights offederal employees."' (alterations in original) (quoting
Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1101,
1103 (2008))). As has become clear through subsequent Bivens jurisprudence, courts are loath to
investigate the adequacy of remedies that a statutory scheme provides as long as the statutory
scheme indicates congressional attention to the matter. One could, however, argue that inadequate
remedies indicate that Congress did not, in fact, exercise its expertise or imply its will in a particular
area.
167. See Volk v. Hobson, 866 F.2d 1398, 1403-04 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Sarullo v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 795-99 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that postal service workplace
investigation of plaintiff who was suspected of selling drugs at work constituted a work-related
process for which the Civil Service Reform Act provided a comprehensive remedial scheme);
Bennett v. Barnett, 210 F.3d 272,275 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that Bush had "left it up to Congress
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does not apply at all.168 As the Fifth Circuit stated, while "[t]he Supreme Court
has not held expressly that the CSRA in all cases precludes federal employees
from bringing Bivens actions arising out of their employment relationship," the
circuit courts "have held that the CSRA precludes at least some Bivens actions
brought in such circumstances."' 69
Other kinds of federal employment have been treated similarly. A Veterans
Administration (VA) employee, for instance, was precluded from suing superiors
under Bivens because his employment was governed by the Department of
Medicine and Surgery (DMS) regulations. 7' Since Congress had delegated to
the department the authority to use internal procedures to address rights
violations, the court concluded that Congress intended that "DMS personnel
should be subject to a less protective grievance system than is available to
ordinary civil service employees" through the CSRA. 7'
At the same time, courts can allow federal employee cases to go forward
when they determine that Congress did not intend a particular application of
federal employment laws. Thus, when an employee in the department of
Agriculture's Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service sued his
superiors, the Eighth Circuit noted that the service employed a nonstandard
hiring practice that left employees outside the CSRA's protective ambit.'72 Since
Congress had not envisioned nonstandard hiring practices, the court concluded,
it could not have intended such employees to be deprived of both CSRA
protections and constitutional damages.'73 The plaintiff did have recourse in the
form of an internal appeals process, but unlike the appeals process in the CSRA,
this nonstandard version allowed him to challenge his supervisor's
unconstitutional conduct only through an appeal to that supervisor himself.174
Although courts normally view administrative appeals systems as the delegated
part of a statutory remedial system, the Eighth Circuit recognized that "LoInly
Congress has the power to decide that a statutory or administrative scheme will
foreclose a Bivens action."' 75 But since Congress could not have foreseen the
service's employment scheme, the court could not infer that Congress had meant
to provide the appropriate remedy" for federal employee constitutional violations and that the Postal
Reorganization Act provided the appropriate remedy for a postal worker claiming constitutional
violations).
168. Dotson, 398 F.3d at 163-65. The court determined that Congress was aware of the
judiciary's internal review procedures for employees and purposely excluded such employees from
the CSRA's ambit. Id. at 161.
169. Rollins v. Marsh, 937 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Karamanos v. Egger, 882
F.2d 447,453(9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to recognize aBivens action by an Internal Revenue Service
employee on the basis of the CSRA's comprehensive remedial scheme).
170. Heaney v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 756 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (5th Cir 1985).
171. Id. at 1219.
172. Krueger v. Lyng, 927 F.2d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 1991).
173. Id. at 1056-57.
174. Id. at 1052-53.
175. Id. at 1055.
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to exclude people in the plaintiffs position from Bivens remedies. 76 Cutting
employees off from CSRA protections, the court concluded, was an executive
policy with no legislative support.'77 It did not indicate that Congress had
intended that result. 178 Thus, the mere presence of a comprehensive statutory
scheme does not suffice to preclude a constitutional damages remedy. As with
implicit preemption, the court must determine that Congress had considered the
kind of situation at issue in the case.
The other consistent impediment to recovery under Bivens is the Internal
Revenue Code. A number of circuits have found that Congress's thorough
regulation of taxes and the Code's redress mechanisms demonstrate
congressional occupation of the field. 179 Thus, plaintiffs who were tricked by an
IRS agent into claiming improper deductions could not sue under Bivens.180 The
court noted that the circuits consistently find "Bivens actions inapplicable for
claims arising from federal tax assessment or collection."'' Circuit courts also
consistently decline to recognize Bivens remedies against the IRS even where the
Internal Revenue Code does not provide complete relief for the violation at issue.
Such cases hold that the existence of that comprehensive remedial scheme, even
176. Id. at 1056; see also Carpenter's Produce v. Arnold, 189 F.3d 686, 689 (8th Cir. 1999)
("The remedial scheme in Krueger, however, unlike that in Chilicky ... was created entirely by
regulation, and that was the point of our holding.").
177. Krueger, 927 F.2d at 1056 ("Congress did not direct, or in any way imply, that these
employees should be excluded from the CSRA; their exclusion is solely the result of the
[s]ecretary's sua sponte decision to use a 'non-traditional' hiring method. It is not a 'non-
inadvertent' act by Congress that excludes Krueger from civil service protection; instead, this
exclusion results solely from the [s]ecretary's having used standard enabling language as the basis
for adopting an uncommon hiring practice.").
178. Id. Six years later, however, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress had indicated its
awareness of these kinds of employees when it permitted their participation in the federal retirement
plan, in addition to other civil service benefits, and that their exclusion from the CSRA's remedial
ambit had thus been (or become) an intentional omission. Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d 988, 992-
93 (9th Cir. 1997) (explicitly recognizing the "non 'employee' status of this type of USDA
worker). The next year, the Eleventh Circuit followed Moore's reasoning but rested its conclusion
on the Administrative Procedure Act rather than the CSRA. See Miller v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.
Farm Servs. Agency, 143 F.3d 1413, 1416 (1 lth Cir. 1998); see also infra note 208.
179. See Shreiber v. Mastrogiovanni, 214 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[A] Bivens action
should not be inferred to permit suits against IRS agents accused of violating a taxpayer's
constitutional rights in the course of makingatax assessment."); Fishbum v. Brown, 125 F.3d 979,
982-83 (6th Cir. 1997) (summarizing extra-circuit case law and concluding that Bivens actions may
not be brought against IRS agents for due process violations arising out of tax collection activities),
abrogated by Hoogerheide v. IRS, 637 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2011); McMillen v. U.S. Dep't of
Treasury, 960 F.2d 187, 190 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (stating that even if alleged IRS actions
violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, "we doubt that the creation of a Bivens remedy would be
an appropriate response").
180. Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004).
181. Id.
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if incomplete or not comparable, precludes Bivens. 182
At the same time, courts can be careful to ascertain not just that the
defendant is an IRS agent, but that the Internal Revenue Code could realistically
be seen to apply to the situation at hand. When taxpayers sued an IRS agent for
allegedly outrageous harassment, the Fifth Circuit concluded the Internal
Revenue Code and its remedial scheme addressed property, not liberty,
interests.'83 If the plaintiff taxpayers could show that the auditor's conduct
implicated liberty interests, the court determined, they would have a Bivens claim
despite the case implicating the Internal Revenue Code.'84
Other, less frequently cited, statutes have precluded Bivens on these same
grounds. Veteran's claims against the Veteran's Association have been rejected
because Congress set up an "elaborate remedial structure" for veteran's benefits,
including an "administrative process ... [that] provid[ed] for a comprehensive
review of veterans' benefits disputes," but explicitly prohibited "judicial review
of [those] disputes."'85 National banking regulation has precluded aBivens claim
182. See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 317 F.3d 401,410-11 (4th Cir. 2003) (denying
a Bivens claim for retaliatory taxation because tax laws provide a comprehensive regulatory scheme,
even if they do not provide complete relief); see also Dahn v. United States, 127 F.3d 1249, 1254
(10th Cir. 1997) ("[I]n light of the comprehensive administrative scheme created by Congress to
resolve tax-related disputes, individual agents of the IRS are also not subject to Bivens actions.");
Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United States, 26 F.3d 1448, 1454
(8th Cir. 1994) ("Congress has provided specific and meaningful remedies for taxpayers who
challenge overzealous tax assessment and collection activities. . . .These carefully crafted
legislative remedies confirm that... Congress's refusal to permit unrestricted damage actions by
taxpayers has not been inadvertent."); Baddour, Inc. v. United States, 802 F.2d 801, 807-09 (5th
Cir. 1986) ("[C]reation of a damages remedy under circumstances where Congress has provided
for corrections of tax collection errors could wreck [sic] havoc with the federal tax system.");
Cameron v. IRS, 773 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[I]t would make the collection of taxes
chaotic if a taxpayer could bypass the remedies provided by Congress simply by bringing a damage
action against Treasury employees.").
183. Rutherford v. United States, 702 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute
I.R.C. §§ 7432-33 (2006), as recognized in Barron v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 117 (D.N.H.
1998). The plaintiffs alleged that the IRS auditor "willfully and maliciously assess[ed] them for
taxes they did not owe, harass[ed] them into paying those taxes, and forc[ed] them to sue for a
refund." Id. at 581. The auditor allegedly "invented" over $100,000 of gross income; assessed the
plaintiffs twice for the same income; demanded "useless documentation"; accused the plaintiffs of
hiding money; "once insisted that [one plaintiff] empty his pockets of money and let him count it";
told one plaintiff, "You don't think I am going to spend this much time on this audit and not come
up with a considerable sum of money due and owing"; and "arranged for his audit report to be
delivered to the [plaintiffs'] home at 4:30 p.m. on Christmas Eve." Id.
184. Id. at 584-85 (remanding for a district court determination of whether allegedly
outrageous conduct by an IRS auditor constituted a deprivation of a Fifth Amendment liberty
interest, in which case a Bivens claim could proceed).
185. Zuspann v. Brown, 60 F.3d 1156, 1161 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Hicks v. Small, 69 F.3d
967, 969 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Bivens was unavailable against the plaintiff veteran's doctor
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by a bank's owner against the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
employees,"' and congressional regulation of federal disaster relief has
precluded applicants' Bivens claims against the agents reviewing eligibility for
relief for race discrimination.187 The Parole Commission and Reorganization Act
of 1978 has precluded a parolee's Bivens action against his parole officer. 88 And
when a group of people who had spent time in lower Manhattan sued the
Environmental Protection Agency for injuries allegedly arising from the
Agency's false statements about air quality and safety in the wake of the World
Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001, the Second Circuit held that the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,8 9 which "provided a
statutory cause of action for claims 'arising out of' the airplane crashes that
destroyed the WTC towers," precluded Bivens remedies. 9 '
One can always question whether Congress's foray into some particular field
really indicates its desire to preclude all remedies it did not happen to construct.
Did Congress really consider all the possible harms that could come to banks
when it created banking regulations? Did it really mean to leave people with no
way to enforce their rights to equal protection under the federal disaster relief
statute? Regardless of whether the courts' interpretations seem realistic, these
cases show the central thread running through special factors analysis: In all
these examples, Congress had considered the area of law and the kind of
plaintiff, at issue. Focusing on implicit indications of legislative will, courts have
consistently found this sufficient to infer that Congress's silence was purposeful.
B. Categorical Bars as Shorthand for Implicit Preclusion Analysis
While most courts explicitly treat special factors analysis as an inquiry into
legislative preclusion, some talk about certain kinds of plaintiffs as categorically
barred from Bivens remedies. 9 ' In such cases, courts do not analyze how
comprehensive a statutory scheme is. They simply determine whether the
plaintiff belongs to a category that they consider barred from constitutional
damages. These sound like different inquiries-statutory scheme versus plaintiff
category-but, in fact, in both kinds of cases, the courts' conclusion rests on an
inquiry into implicit preclusion of remedies by the legislature. The difference is
because Congress had comprehensively regulated veterans' relations with the Veterans
Administration through the Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988).
186. Sinclair v. Hawke, 314 F.3d 934, 940-42 (8th Cir. 2003).
187. Carpenter's Produce v. Arnold, 189 F.3d 686, 687, 689 (8th Cir. 1999).
188. Rauschenberg v. Williamson, 785 F.2d 985, 988 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
189. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
190. Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2008). Benzman also described the
area of federal disaster relief as thoroughly occupied by congressional regulation in a way
analogous to Congress's control over the military as described in Chappell and held that the
plaintiffs had failed to plead a constitutional violation. Id. at 126-29.
191. See, e.g., Corr. Sen's. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70-71, 74 (2001) (holding that
Bivens remedies would not be extended to private corporations).
2012]
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
simply that courts using categorical bars do not conduct the legislative preclusion
inquiry themselves. Instead, they take as their starting point the conclusion of an
inquiry already conducted by the Supreme Court. The categorical approach thus
depends entirely on the question of legislative preclusion. This is because the
kinds of plaintiffs that have been barred from constitutional damages have been
barred precisely because the Supreme Court has found that the comprehensive
remedial schemes available to them indicate Congress's occupation of their field.
As discussed above, for instance, civil servants have been barred from Bivens
because of the CSRA and members of the military because of Congress's
occupation of that field.192 In reality, then, this categorical style of special factors
inquiry still focuses on congressional preemption of judicial remedies: asking
about plaintiff categories is just a shorthand for asking about remedial schemes.
The inconsistency among courts of appeal probably stems from the Supreme
Court's own Bivens cases, which have described statutory schemes in both ways
at different times. In practice, the special factors inquiry, while phrased in
varying ways, remains an inquiry into legislative preclusion.
In this vein, a Bivens suit by civilian employees at a naval base was
precluded solely because the claims arose from a "federal employment
relationship," '193 a decision that treated the Supreme Court's preemption analysis
in Bush v. Lucas'94 as a categorical bar of federal employee Bivens suits. Other
courts have combined the categorical bar approach with reference to a
comprehensive statutory scheme, as when the Third Circuit determined that "in
light of the existence of [statutory] remedies the employer-employee relationship
... is a special factor."' 1
95
Similarly, for cases involving members of the military, brief references to the
Feres doctrine sometimes stand in for analysis. Thus, a plaintiffs status as a
member of the military precluded his Bivens suit challenging his superiors'
racially discriminatory failure to promote him. 96 Additionally, a discharged
serviceman was prevented from challenging his military jailers' Eighth
192. See supra notes 167, 185 and accompanying text.
193. Zimbelman v. Savage, 228 F.3d 367,370 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Palermo v. Rorex, 806
F.2d 1266, 1270-73 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the congressionally regulated nature of federal
employment weighed againstjudicially created remedies). Palermo preceded Chilicky; the Supreme
Court analysis at that point still focused on the special relationship of the federal employer and
federal employees, rather than on the existence of a statutory remedial scheme per se. Id. at 1271.
194. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
195. Purtill v. Harris, 658 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633a, provided a comprehensive remedial scheme for a
federal employee's complaint); see also Hall v. Clinton, 235 F.3d 202,206 (4th Cir. 2000) (denying
a Bivens claim because of federal employment and comprehensive regulation by the CSRA, even
though the CSRA did not provide relief for the plaintiff's particular claims); Yokum v. Frank, No.
90-2196, 1991 WL 118008, at *12-13 (4th Cir. July 3, 1991) (holding that the combination of a
plaintiff's federal employment and the fact that a comprehensive remedial scheme was available for
his complaints created a special factor barring Bivens remedies).
196. Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 340 (4th Cir. 1996).
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Amendment violations because the conduct and the conviction that landed him
in prison occurred while he was still in the military. 9 7 While some courts treat
the Feres doctrine as part of the special factors analysis, 98 others eschew the
analysis altogether. Instead, they treat Chappell as importing the Feres bar on
military suits into the Bivens arena. For example, holding that a military
serviceman could not challenge a hazing incident, the First Circuit mentioned
special factors but performed its analysis exclusively under Feres. 199 Courts of
appeal have also built on the military personnel analysis to bar Bivens suits by
employees of the Public Health Service (PHS). The PHS is not part of the
military, but it is similarly structured and in many ways treated similarly by
Congress."' Two circuits have relied on the Feres doctrine to bar a PHS
employee's discrimination suit against PHS superiors.2 1
Thus, even when courts cite a plaintiff's membership in a particular category
as the reason for refusing to recognize a Bivens claim, the analysis underlying
that decision still rests on whether the Bivens remedy has been precluded by
legislation. And that makes perfect sense, since the central problem with Bivens
remedies revolves around the judiciary's attempt not to infringe on the remedy-
creating prerogative of the legislature.
IV. OUTLIERS
The preceding Part illustrated that the majority of courts agree that the
special factors analysis inquires into legislative will regarding constitutional
damages remedies, even though they may refer to it by different terms in
different cases. In this Part, I turn to courts that have deviated from the
mainstream. The first kind of deviation involves mistaken results: Some courts
unreasonably interpret statutes that are only peripherally relevant to the situation
in a particular case as indicating a legislative desire to preclude Bivens remedies.
The second kind of deviation is more serious: Courts may mistakenly look to
executive will as determining the fate of constitutional damages. In this
situation, the court not only deviates from the accepted doctrine of the special
197. Ricks v. Nickels, 295 F.3d 1124, 1130-31 (10th Cir. 2002).
198. Id. at 1128-30.
199. Day v. Mass. Air Nat'l Guard, 167 F.3d 678, 682, 684 (1 st Cir. 1999); see also Wright
v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 589-91 (1 st Cir. 1993) (holding that the claims of a part-military, part-civilian,
technician were barred because they arose from events incident to military service, and noting
Chappell's reasoning without performing a special factors analysis, resting instead on the Feres
doctrine alone).
200. The PHS provides medical care in prisons and immigration detention centers. The
Supreme Court recently barred an inmate's Bivens action against the PHS for Eighth Amendment
violations, but did so on statutory interpretation grounds, without reference to Bivens special
factors. Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1852-55 (2010). The special factors analysis mostly
focused on the ability of PHS employees, not inmates, to sue superior PHS personnel. Id. at 1851.
201. See Middlebrooks v. Leavitt, 525 F.3d 341, 350 (4th Cir. 2008); Diaz-Romero v.
Mukasey, 514 F.3d 115, 118-19 (1st Cir. 2008).
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factors analysis, it also fails to recognize that the underlying separation of powers
concern in constitutional damages is the relationship between the judiciary and
the legislature. Such cases should be read narrowly to prevent these mistakes
from setting broad precedent that undermines the logic of the special factors
inquiry.
A. Mistaking Peripheral Statutes for Implicit Preclusion
A few courts have mistakenly found Bivens precluded by statutes that touch
only peripherally on the matters at issue in a case. Instead of looking for
indications that Congress considered the situation presented in a case, such courts
have settled for statutory schemes that merely implicate some of the interests or
issues involved. Taking the existence of some remedial scheme to preclude a
Bivens remedy without ensuring that the scheme indicates that Congress
considered the situation at stake, such courts mistakenly find a congressional
policy preference where none could have been implied. Even this mistaken
approach, however, shows that courts look to congressional will to determine
whether to recognize a Bivens action.
For instance, in Downie v. Middleburg Heights,"2 the Sixth Circuit held that
the Privacy Act precluded a constitutional damages suit by a Customs Service
informant against his handler.2 °3 The handler had allegedly asked the Customs
Service to "blacklist[]" the plaintiff from future work; arranged to have his
firearms license revoked and his firearms seized; arranged for a false arrest
record to be entered about him; and threatened to stop working with the
plaintiff's boss if the plaintiff were not fired.2" The Sixth Circuit assumed that
because the case involved records created by government agents, the Privacy Act
addressed the issues it raised.2"5 However, the plaintiff's claim was not primarily
that the defendant collected incorrect information or even created false
records-issues the Privacy Act addresses. Rather, the plaintiff claimed that a
federal actor requested retaliatory action by the agency (rather than merely
202. 301 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2002).
203. Id. at 696. The Privacy Act of 1974 regulates how government agencies collect, keep,
use, and disseminate information about individuals. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006 & Supp. 2010). With
certain exceptions, it requires agencies to announce the kinds of information they collect and the
"routine uses" they put it to, maintain accurate records; and allow individuals to access and contest
inaccurate records. See id. § 552a(a)(3) (defining "maintain" to include "maintain, collect, use, or
disseminate"); id. § 552a(a)(4) (defining "record" as "item, collection, or grouping of information
about an individual that is maintained by an agency"); see also id. §§ 552a(b), (d), (e)(4). The Act
allows individuals to sue agencies for damages for failure to adhere to its requirements. Id. §
552a(g). The Privacy Act makes no provisions for constitutional violations, but as discussed above,
after Chilicky the alternative statutory remedial scheme no longer needed to provide comparable
relief to Bivens; in a preemption-like approach, the fact that Congress has considered the issue
suffices, even if Congress then decided not to provide remedies for constitutional violation.
204. Downie, 301 F.3d at 690-91.
205. Id at 692.
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provided an incorrect record); provided false information to law enforcement
(rather than failed to properly maintain a record); and threatened third parties
with sanctions to achieve his retaliatory goal.2 °6
There is no indication that Congress ever considered these kinds of wrongs
relevant to the area that the Privacy Act regulates: government agency record
maintenance. 2 7 The Sixth Circuit's reasoning perversely suggests that a federal
employee can immunize himself from Bivens suits simply by creating records
relating to his conduct. The Privacy Act, in short, may be peripherally related to
the issues in Downie, but it cannot reasonably be read to indicate a congressional
preference regarding them. Downie amply demonstrates how a peripherally
relevant statute-a statute that has something to do with the facts of a case but
does not primarily regulate the parties or situations at issue--can be recruited to
preclude a Bivens remedy by a court that fails to perform the special factors
analysis correctly.2"8 At the same time, such decisions demonstrate that, even
206. Id. at 696.
207. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (providing grounds for suit against agency); see also Quinn
v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussing the elements of a claim brought under the
Privacy Act). In addition, the Privacy Act provides only for suit against the agency, not against the
individual agent. Id. at 135.
208. Downie, 301 F.3d at 696. A similar mistake motivated the decision in Wilson v. Libby,
which declined to recognize a Bivens remedy for Valerie Plame Wilson, the undercover CIA
operative whose identity was revealed in a newspaper column by Robert Novak. Wilson v. Libby,
535 F.3d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Novak obtained the information from then-Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage, and employees in the Offices of the President and Vice President also
revealed Ms. Wilson's identity to the press. Id. The D.C. Circuit declined to recognize Wilson's
claim against those employees, holding that because the Privacy Act, which "regulates the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information about individuals by federal
agencies," excluded the Offices of the President or the Vice President from its definition of
"agency," the Act itself must preclude Wilson's Bivens claim. Id. at 704-09 (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). By its own description, Wilson thus concluded that a
comprehensive statutory scheme regulating agencies precluded claims not brought under that statute
against individuals who were not part of an agency. A more logical approach might conclude that
the Privacy Act does not control claims against persons it does not regulate. The Wilson court
suggested that there was a connection as the plaintiffs' Bivens claims all "alleg[ed] damages from
the improper disclosure of information covered by the Privacy Act." Id. at 707. But the Privacy
Act does not purport to regulate information; it regulates agencies. The Wilson court thus
unreasonably inferred a congressional intent from the mere fact that the Privacy Act, like the
lawsuit, dealt with information.
In a final example of peripheral-statute preclusion, a federal employee excluded from CSRA
protections could not bring a Bivens suit because he had recourse to remedies under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which the court held was a comprehensive statutory remedial
scheme. Miller v. U.S. Dep't ofAgric. Farm Servs. Agency, 143 F.3d 1413, 1416 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
Rather than holding, like other circuits, that Congress had occupied the field of federal employment,
the court asserted that "the existence of a right to judicial review under the APA is, alone, sufficient
to preclude a federal employee from bringing a Bivens action." Id. at 1416. It thereby treated the
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when they mistakenly read irrelevant statutes to preclude Bivens remedies, courts
confronting constitutional damages cases consistently attempt to discern how
Congress wants such cases to be addressed.
B. Mistaking the Executive for the Legislature
Another kind of outlier may become more prominent as Bivens cases
emerging from national security projects become more common." 9 The
publicized, politicized nature of such cases may blind courts to the doctrinal
coherence and rationale of the special factors analysis. Instead of asking whether
Congress has indicated a preference for the availability of remedies, such a
decision asks about the preferences of the Executive. As this Article has
detailed, however, executive preferences do not fit the logic, the rationale, or the
doctrinal history of the special factors analysis. As a matter of doctrinal history,
I have demonstrated a broad, cross-circuit agreement that special factors analysis
looks for implicit legislative preclusion of remedies. The rationale of the special
factors analysis focuses on maintaining a balance between the Judiciary and the
Legislature, not the Executive. Logically, because the Executive is usually
named as a defendant in Bivens cases, it makes little sense to hinge a case's
justiciability on the defendant's desire to allow the plaintiff a remedy.210
Arar v. Ashcroft,211 a prominent example of this mistaken approach, declined
to recognize a constitutional damages remedy for a plaintiff secretly detained and
then rendered to Syria, where he was tortured for a year.212 United States
APA's provisions for review of agency action as though they regulated the federal employment
relationship. However, other courts have disagreed that the APA is a sufficient ground. See
Munsell v. Dep't ofAgric., 509 F.3d 572, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("[W]e are unaware of any Supreme
Court decision holding that APA review alone is sufficient to eliminate the need for a Bivens
remedy.").
209. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591
(7th Cir. 2011), reh 'g en banc granted, vacated (Oct. 28, 2011).
210. This is not to say that the Executive is irrelevant to remedy creation. As I point out
above, the modem Executive plays an important role in crafting legislation, and the comprehensive
remedial schemes that preclude Bivens suits often come partly from administrative agencies. Even
in these cases, the creation of remedies is, in the end, authorized or delegated by Congress. It may
be that Congress can, and maybe even should, delegate the power to create and to preclude
statutorily implied causes of action to administrative agencies. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public
Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role ofAdministrative Agencies,
91 VA. L. REV. 93, 126-27 (2005). Even if that were the case, the delegation, and thus the decision,
would come from Congress. One can also question whether any such congressional delegation
would be valid insofar as it allowed the executive to preclude constitutional, rather than only
statutory, causes of action. The point for my purposes is that, for special factors analysis, the power
to decide lies with Congress.
211. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
212. Id. at 563-64, 566. Arar is a complex case with a complex opinion and several dissents.
I outline it here but limit my discussion to the use of special factors to deny the plaintiff's Bivens
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officials seized Arar, a Canadian-Syrian dual national, while he was changing
planes at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York on his way to Canada. Held in
New York without access to an attorney for nearly two weeks of
interrogation-Arar claimed that federal agents lied to his lawyer to prevent her
from finding him-he was subsequently deported to Syria without a hearing,
despite his Canadian passport and his assertion that he feared torture in Syria.213
In an en banc decision, the Second Circuit concluded that special factors
precluded Arar's Bivens suit. 14
The court first decided that the case presented a new "context" for Bivens:
"extraordinary rendition," a term referring to "the extrajudicial transfer of a
person from one [country] to another., 215  Despite determining that the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a comprehensive statutory scheme
regulating aliens in the United States, did not address the kind of situation of
which Arar complained,21 6 the court concluded that special factors barred relief.
claims. The facts of Arar's experience have been widely reported. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser,
Appeals Court Rejects Suit by Canadian Man OverDetention and Torture Claim, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
2,2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/nyregion/03arar-web.html; Editorial, The Unfinished
Case of Maher Arar, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2009, at A26, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/02/18/opinion/18wed2.html.
213. Arar, 585 F.3d at 565-66. Under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), to which the
United States is a party, "[n]o State Party shall expel, return ... or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture," regardless of the ground on which such torture would occur. Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.
39/46, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984); see also Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231 (2006 & Supp. 2010)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(A) ("[Tihe Attorney General may
not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom
would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion."). Arar's complaint further alleged that his fear
of torture in Syria was justified. He was incommunicado for a year in an underground cell
measuring "six feet by three, and seven feet high." Arar, 585 F.3d at 566. Furthermore, he was
beaten with electrical wire and threatened with permanent injury. Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial at 16, Arar, 585 F.3d 559 (No. CV-04-0249). Arar also made a claim under the Torture
Victim Protection Act, which I do not discuss here. Arar, 585 F.3d at 563; see 28 U.S.C. §
1350(a)(1) (2006).
214. Arar, 585 F.3d at 563.
215. Id. at 564 & n. 1. The dissenters in Arar disputed that the case presents a "new context."
Id. at 583 (Sack J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216. ld. at 571. The court noted that Arar was not attempting to enter the United States, but
was merely passing through, and concluded that "it is not clear that the INA's judicial review
provisions govern circumstances of involuntary rendition." Id. It also noted that, given the alleged
conduct of the United States employees who detained Arar, such as serving him "with the removal
order while he was already en route to Amman, the INA could have afforded him no relief' at the
time of the events in question. Id. Although Arar is clearly not an immigration case-insofar as
2012]
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
The opinion did not clearly distinguish all the special factors it pointed to,
naming some and implying several others. Examining the concerns the court
raised, however, shows that none of the concerns constituted a special factor
under the accepted doctrine. Had the court analyzed its concerns within the
parameters of the applicable case law, moreover, it would have found Arar's suit
was not barred.2" 7 Arar, in short, mistakenly treated special factors not as a legal
term of art, but as an appeal to the political intuitions of judges.218
Arar is important for two main reasons. First, it may set precedent that
would confuse the special factors doctrine and render its rationale incoherent,
encouraging other courts to believe that executive desires and judges' own
inchoate misgivings suffice to "counsel hesitation"2 19 in Bivens cases. For this
reason, it should be read narrowly. Second, by analyzing concerns that belong
to diverse legal doctrines, it may encourage other courts to forego a legally
grounded analysis of the issues raised by a Bivens suit, stymieing the
development of other doctrines by lumping unrelated issues under the special
factors label.
The Second Circuit cited the lack of clarity in the law regarding
extraordinary rendition as one reason to uphold dismissal.22 Lack of clarity in
Arar was not attempting to enter the United States but merely changing planes in it-this
description does suggests another interpretation: that the INA did provide a remedial scheme for
at least the parts of Arar's experience that occurred while in United States custody, but United
States employees actively obstructed Arar's recourse to that remedial scheme. It is unclear why the
court did not discuss this possibility, which suggests that federal employees who breached
statutorily imposed constraints violated Arar's right to due process.
217. For a similar reading of the Arar court's mistake, see Carlos M. Vkzquez & Stephen I.
Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question After Minneci v.
Pollard, 161 U. PA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 10), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=2038641 (explaining that the Arar court's concerns were "potentially relevant ... to
questions of immunity or privilege or preemption" but were "not relevant to the decision whether
to recognize a Bivens claim").
218. The Arar court affirmed the dismissal of the case on a number of grounds. Specifically,
it listed the following reasons as special factors: the law surrounding extraordinary rendition is not
clear; classified information would be relevant to adjudicating the claims, and the potential
revelation of classified or sensitive information would allow the plaintiff to pressure the government
to settle the case irrespective of the merits ("graymail"); because classified and sensitive information
would be relevant to adjudicating the claims, the case would likely require closed hearings and
sealed evidence; Arar's lawsuit is actually aimed not at individual actors but at the executive policy
of extraordinary rendition; the court would have to determine whether Syria offered reliable
assurances that Arar would not be tortured there, and whether federal employees acted in good faith
on the basis of any such assurances; and the case would force the court to adjudicate issues of
national security and foreign policy. Arar, 585 F.3d at 573-77. In what follows, I examine each
factor to show why it is not a Bivens special factor and what doctrine it properly belongs to.
219. Id. at 573.
220. Id. at 581. The court did concede that this lack of clarity "may or may not amount to a
special factor." Id. at 580.
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the law governing defendants' conduct is, however, amply addressed by qualified
immunity, an affirmative defense which provides that a federal agent is only
liable for conduct that violates rights that were clearly established at the time of
the events at issue.22' The special factors analysis, in contrast, attends to the
availability of remedies for plaintiffs, not the legal regime governing the conduct
of defendants. The distinction matters. The qualified immunity inquiry asks
whether a defendant's conduct violated clearly established laws, and whether a
law is clearly established turns on social and legal expectations that may change
over time. Courts assessing that question "promote[] the development of
constitutional precedent., 222  The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the
desirability of this developmental process, noting that if courts' qualified
immunity inquiry does not serve to specify existing and emerging rights,
"[q]ualified immunity . . . may frustrate . . . the promotion of law-abiding
behavior" as "[c]ourts fail to clarify uncertain questions, fail to address novel
claims, fail to give guidance to officials about how to comply with legal
requirements. 223 Special factors analysis, which focuses on Congress's views
about remedies rather than on the contours of rights, has no such developmental
process built in. By mistaking qualified immunity for a special factor, Arar thus
impeded the development of constitutional precedent that the Supreme Court has
said is central to "the promotion of law-abiding behavior." '224
The Arar court also upheld dismissal because the case would inevitably
involve classified information. 25 This concern does not relate to Congress's
views on the availability of remedies; it is a prudential concern, not one of
special factors. It has been addressed by Congress in the Classified Information
Procedures Act, which lets courts balance their need for information with the
Executive's need to keep certain information secret through techniques like
protective orders and discovery privileges.226 Congress's regulation of classified
information illustrates that Congress assumed that judicial proceedings would
sometimes use such information, and did not intend to allow the mere presence
of classified information to preclude remedies.227
221. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (dismissing a Bivens suit
on qualified immunity grounds because "[n]o reasonable government official would have been on
notice that plaintiffs had any Fifth Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights" at the time of the
events at issue).
222. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
223. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011).
224. Id.
225. Arar, 585 F.3d at 576.
226. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2006 & Supp. 2010)).
227. Strangely, the Arar court explicitly recognized that governments, like courts, routinely
announce the results of their investigations while keeping classified information secret. As the
opinion notes, the Canadian government completed a thorough investigation of Arar's claims and
"paid [him] compensation for [his] role in the events surrounding this lawsuit, but has also asserted
the need for Canada itself to maintain the confidentiality of certain classified materials related to
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Arar further cited the possibility of"graymail," 228 or a "'lawsuit[] brought to
induce the [government] to settle a case.., out of fear that any effort to litigate
the action would reveal classified information that may undermine ongoing
covert operations,' or otherwise compromise foreign policy efforts., 229 This
factor merely reiterated the court's concern with classified information, and the
government's susceptibility to graymail is simply one potential reaction to the
possibility that information will be revealed. While the term "graymail" raises
the specter of impropriety due to its color-based proximity to blackmail, pressure
to settle is a normal byproduct of our legal system.230 The court's discussion
revealed no indication of a congressional preference as to the availability of
remedies.
The Arar court also grounded its finding of preclusion on the possibility that
"[t]he court's reliance on information that cannot be introduced into the public
record" would necessitate closing judicial proceedings to the public.' The
Supreme Court has held the public's right to witness judicial proceedings is
"implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment 23 2 but has maintained that
this right is not absolute. Instead, the Court has laid out, with some specificity,
the requirements for closing a court to the public. 233 It is clear, then, that the
Supreme Court does not consider the possibility that a case may require closing
the court a reason for precluding the case itself,234 and there is no indication that
Congress disagrees.
The ostensible policy-oriented nature of the lawsuit also posed a concern in
Arar. "Although this action is cast in terms of a claim for money damages
against the defendants in their individual capacities," the court stated, "it operates
as a constitutional challenge to policies promulgated by the executive." '235 But
[his] claims." Arar, 585 F.3d at 576.
228. Id. at 578.
229. Id. at 578-79 (second alteration in original) (quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11
(2005)).
230. See, e.g., Dodds v. Am. Broad. Co., 145 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Exerting
pressure on parties is part of the settlement process ... .
231. Arar, 585 F.3d at 577.
232. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion).
233. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal.,
464 U.S. 501, 509-12 (1984)). The Second Circuit, which decided Arar, has specifically adopted
the Waller standard. See Williams v. Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2001).
234. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 609-10 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
presumption of openness... can be, and routinely is, overcome. We regularly hear, on the basis
of partially or totally sealed records, not only cases implicating national security or diplomatic
concerns, but those involving criminal defendants' cooperation with prosecutors, other criminal
matters,... probation department reports, upon which federal criminal sentences are to a significant
extent typically based .... trade secrets, and any manner of other criminal and civil matters. Hardly
a week goes by, in our collective experience, in which some document or fact is not considered by
a panel of this Court out of the public eye." (internal citations omitted)).
235. Id. at 574 (majority opinion).
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neither Congress nor the courts have ever conditioned the availability of
remedies for constitutional wrongs on the plaintiffs motivation.236 Indeed,
according to the dissenting justices inArar, a broader policy orientation is typical
of civil rights actions,23 7 and Congress has never indicated its intent to preclude
civil rights remedies on this basis.238
236. A litigant's motivation may sometimes influence how a court deals with a lawsuit. For
example, a government prosecutor who pursues criminal charges for improper purposes may be
civilly liable to that defendant on a Bivens theory of retaliatory prosecution. See, e.g., Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 263-66 (2006) (holding that a Bivens plaintiff suing for malicious
prosecution, based on retaliation against the plaintiff's exercise of First Amendment rights, must
show that the prosecutor had no probable cause on which to proceed). Similarly, the common-law
torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process "provided causes of action against private
defendants for unjustified harm arising out of the misuse of governmental processes." Wyatt v.
Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 (1992). In contrast, the Arar court took the opposite approach and treated
aplaintiffs purportedly improper motivation as a bar to the underlying process itself. It is unclear
what legal theory supported this approach.
Arar also did not explain why it would be wrong for a plaintiff to seek vindication of his rights
through a judicial determination that they had been violated, notwithstanding any desire for
monetary damages. See, e.g., Pfander, Resolving the Qualiftedlmmunity Dilemma, supra note 21,
at 1620-26 (proposing that plaintiffs seeking to vindicate rights through judicial determinations that
rights have been violated should sue for nominal damages, thus eliminating the need for qualified
immunity, which is meant only to alleviate the threat of individual liability by public officials).
Pfander notes that the violation of individual rights is, itself, a cognizable injury quite apart from
any monetary damages. Id. at 1620 ("Today, no one questions the power of the federal courts to
declare the rights of the parties in a case of actual controversy.").
237. Arar, 585 F.3d at 605 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 634-35
(Calabresi, J., dissenting).
238. Aside from being ungrounded in legislation or case law, precluding a lawsuit because it
targets a policy implies that a plaintiff's desire to affect executive policy immunizes the federal
employees who carry out that policy from suit. The Arar court appeared to view this kind of
plaintiff-induced immunity as a form of judicial deference to executive policy. Id. at 574-75
(majority opinion). But a court's ability to determine whether a federal employee violated a
constitutional right does not depend on an evaluation of the policy the employee was working
under. Id. at 574. Moreover, such immunity presents a practical problem: It burdens courts with
evaluating the motivation of a lawsuit to determine whether it seeks individual remedy or policy
change. See, e.g., id. at 576. This burden is unmanageable not only because the court has little
access to a litigant's inner states, but also because litigants often act on a variety of motivations,
some of which they may not even recognize. Empirical studies of people involved in the civil
justice system consistently reveal that litigants have multiple, often conflicting, attitudes toward the
cases in which they are involved. See, e.g., CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY
IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS 1-2 (1994) ("[W]e address the irony that, although courts and law are
central to the ways some residents construct their sense of community, these same individuals
disparage the courts as having been captured by the 'wrong' people for the 'wrong' kinds of
cases."); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 5-6 (1990).
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Executive control over national security and foreign policy also led the Arar
court to find that Bivens actions were precluded.239 Executive policy control,
however, does not indicate how Congress would treat claims by those whose
legal rights are violated in the course of carrying out a policy. Using executive
policy as a rationalization for precluding Bivens actions implies that Congress's
delegation of policy powers to the Executive would also delegate an authority to
violate constitutional rights. Of course, Congress has no such authority to
delegate.24° Thus, this concern does not belong in a special factors analysis.
Rather, courts' relations to executive policy properly fit the framework of the
political question doctrine.241 Although the political question doctrine does not
traditionally include conduct related to national security, courts often bundle
national security and foreign affairs into related areas that fall particularly under
the Executive's control.242 The political question doctrine has caused courts to
refrain from matters which include: determining the start and end points of
military hostilities;243 recognizing foreign powers and their representatives;2
ratifying and interpreting treaties;... and, adjudicating presidential decisions to
engage in hostilities abroad.246 Arar, in contrast, alleged that he was denied due
239. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 575 ("A suit seeking a damages remedy against senior officials who
implement an extraordinary rendition policy would enmesh the courts ineluctably in an assessment
of the validity and rationale of that policy and its implementation in this particular case, matters that
directly affect significant diplomatic and national security concerns.").
240. The U.S. Constitution itself grants the President some foreign policy powers, but just as
Congress has no authority to violate constitutional rights and therefore cannot delegate any such
authority, the Constitution provides no authority to violate itself. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §
265 (2012) ("[T]he legislature may not delegate to the people the power to enact a law which the
legislature itself is forbidden by the [C]onstitution to enact.").
241. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.6 (5th ed. 2007).
242. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291-92 (1981).
243. See, e.g., Commercial Trust Co. of N.J. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923) (holding that
Congress alone determines when military hostilities have ended); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 19, 29-30 (1827) (holding that Congress delegated authority to the President to determine
when hostilities have begun and to call up the militia in response).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,330 (1937) (holding that the President
had the authority to recognize and pursue diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union).
245. See, e.g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288-90 (1902) (holding that courts cannot
decide whether a treaty survives when a signatory country becomes part of another country).
246. See generally Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (In
a challenge to the United States' "presence in, and military assistance to, El Salvador," the "war
powers issue presented a nonjusticiable political question."); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147, 1152 (2d Cir. 1973)
("[J]udicial inquiry with respect to the Vietnam War into the domain of tactical and strategic
military decisions [of the President presents a] nonjusticiable political question."); Ange v. Bush,
752 F. Supp. 509, 517-18 (D.D.C. 1990) (addressing the Persian Gulf); see also ANTHONY A.
D'AMATo& ROBERTM. O'NEIL, THE JUDICIARY AND VIETNAM 51-58 (1972) (collecting cases and
discussing the dilemma of political questions in determining whether justiciable).
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process while in the United States and that U.S. employees conspired to have him
tortured. Actions governed under U.S. law are far removed from the kinds of
foreign relations considerations that arise from military action in foreign states.247
As the Second Circuit, where Arar was heard, noted shortly before the Arar
decision came down, the mere fact that a case implicates foreign policy or
national security does not bring the political question doctrine into play.248 The
claims in Arar would be justiciable under the political question doctrine. As the
Supreme Court recently held, "an appeal of the President presenting free-ranging
assertions of foreign policy consequences," but "unaccompanied by a persuasive
legal claim," cannot in itself suffice to sustain a decision in the Executive's
favor.
2 49
247. See, e.g., Solomon B. Shinerock, Samantar v. Yousuf. Recent Development in the Laws
Governing Civil Torture Claims in U.S. Courts, 17 BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 155, 159 (2011) ("The
central issue before the Court in Samantar was whether an individual sued for conduct undertaken
in his official capacity is immune as a 'foreign state' within the meaning of the [Foreign Sovereign
Immunities] Act [of 1976].").
248. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309,322-23 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'don other
grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2527,2529-30,2535 (2011). American Electric held that the political question
doctrine did not bar a nuisance suit based on harms arising from climate change. Id. The Supreme
Court did not disturb that holding, but reversed the Second Circuit on the substantive issue of
preemption by the Environmental Protection Act. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540. In
American Electric, the Second Circuit emphasized that the political question doctrine should not
be applied lightly, even in cases that involved important political issues; rather, courts should
examine whether settled legal rules could address the actual issues presented in the case. Am. Elec.
Power Co., 582 F.3d at 323. The Second Circuit cited approvingly another decision, involving a
wrongful death case in which an American was killed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO). Id. at 328-29. The PLO argued that the political question doctrine barred the case "because
it raised 'foreign policy questions and political questions in a volatile context[, i.e., international
terrorism,] lacking satisfactory criteria for judicial determination.' Id. at 329 (alteration in
original) (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro
in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991)). The Second Circuit, however,
"looked beyond '[tihe fact that the issues before us arise in a politically charged context,"' to
determine that the claims themselves were those of "an ordinary tort." Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49).
249. See Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866,2868 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (noting the petitioner in Garcia was a Mexican national who had not been given access
to his consulate, as required under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, before being
convicted of murder and sentenced to death); see also Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331,
337 (2006) (addressing Article 36 ofthe Vienna Convention). The United States, as amicus curiae,
asked the Supreme Court to stay the execution pending the passage of congressional legislation
implementing the Convention. Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2867. Acknowledging the United States'
warning "of the grave international consequences that will follow from" allowing the execution to
go forward, the Court concluded, "Congress evidently did not find these consequences sufficiently
grave to prompt its enactment of implementing legislation" for the Vienna Convention. Id. at 2868
(citations omitted). The Court held there was "no authority to stay an execution in light of an
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Finally, the Arar opinion concluded that Bivens remedies were not available
because hearing evidence in the case might disturb the "general allocation of
authority over foreign relations to the political branches. 2 5' Arar claimed that
he was wrongly removed to a country where he would likely be tortured; federal
regulations "authorize the removal of an alien to a foreign country following
receipt from that country of sufficiently reliable assurances that the alien will not
be tortured."25' A district court hearing the case would thus have to "determine
whether any such assurances were received from" Syria and "whether the
relevant defendants relied upon them in good faith." '252 According to the Arar
opinion, such a determination would intrude upon the foreign relations authority
of the political branches and therefore posed a special factor.253 American
tradition grants the Executive extra authority over foreign relations and national
security, but how federal employees may act in furtherance of executive policies
is still subject to the strictures of law created by Congress.254 The fact that
receiving and acting upon foreign assurances can implicate sensitive political
areas does not indicate a congressional preference as to how claims relating to
such assurances should be treated, which is the focus of the special factors
inquiry.255 In fact, this concern properly belongs to the state secrets privilege,
appeal of the President presenting free-ranging assertions of foreign policy consequences, when
those assertions come unaccompanied by a persuasive legal claim." Id. (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
250. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 578 (2d Cir. 2009).
251. Id.; see also Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c)
(2011) ("(1) The Secretary of State may forward to the Attorney General assurances that the
Secretary has obtained from the government of a specific country that an alien would not be
tortured there if the alien were removed to that country. (2) If the Secretary of State forwards
assurances described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section to the Attorney General for consideration
by the Attorney General or her delegates under this paragraph, the Attorney General shall
determine, in consultation with the Secretary of State, whether the assurances are sufficiently
reliable to allow the alien's removal to that country consistent with Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture."). Aliens may also be removed absent any assurances, but "[a] government report
state[d] that [Arar] involve[d] assurances received from other governments in connection with the
determination that Arar's removal to Syria would be consistent with Article 3 of the CAT." Arar,
585 F.3d at 577-78.
252. Arar, 585 F.3d at 578.
253. The Arar opinion does not specify the particular elements of this situation that it
considered to be a special factor. Insofar as the court was concerned with the use of sensitive
information in itself, that issue resembled the classified information issue discussed above. See id.
Insofar as the issue was one of foreign relations, it implicated the political question doctrine, also
discussed above. See id.
254. Id. at 575. Moreover, some of Arar's claims, such as the allegation that federal employees
denied him access to counsel by lying to his attorney and that federal employees denied him access
to a neutral adjudicator to determine his country of destination by serving his Notice to Appear
while he was already in transit, did not implicate foreign relations. Id. at 563.
255. Id. at 577-78.
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which implicates the distribution of authority between the Judiciary and the
Executive by limiting discovery or, in the extreme case, barring a suit altogether
if producing the necessary evidence would pose a grave danger to national
security. 256 In Arar, the Government did not invoke that privilege.
One can imagine, of course, national security dangers attendant upon
producing any assurances the United States received from Syria, and it may be
impossible, as well as inappropriate, for a district court to determine if any such
assurances were "sufficiently reliable. 257 It is not clear that either the production
or the determination would have been necessary in prosecuting Arar's case. A
court could certainly determine whether assurances were received without
inquiring further into their content, as well as determining whether the relevant
officials determined that they were "sufficiently reliable," as required by the
regulations, 258 without entering either assurances or official determinations into
the record. Similarly, whether federal employees acted in good faith is a fairly
standard judicial question about the internal states of individuals subject to U.S.
law.259 Inquiring into good faith does not necessarily require evaluating the
objective merit of that faith. Absent the government's proper invocation of state
secrets privilege, then, there is little reason for a court to decide sua sponte that
it applies, as the Arar court effectively did.26°
None of the concerns cited in Arar to preclude constitutional damages fit the
existingjurisprudence of special factors. Arar thus misunderstood, and muddied,
the doctrinal coherence that other courts and cases had achieved. More
importantly, Arar's concerns focused on the relationship between the courts and
the Executive. 26 ' As I have detailed, the point of a special factors analysis is to
maintain the proper balance of power between the courts and Congress.
Misunderstanding that rationale leads to more than just a muddier doctrine: It
eliminates the whole reason for special factors analyses to exist at all. Plenty of
256. See, e.g., id. at 605 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 634
(Calabresi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the Second Circuit, where Arar was
heard, the state secrets privilege requires the "head of the department with control over the matter
in question" to personally assert that "disclosure [of the information in question) would be inimical
to national security." Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991).
257. Arar, 585 F.3d at 578.
258. See Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c) (2011)
(instructing that "[i]f the Secretary of State forwards assurances" regarding torture received in
foreign countries "to the Attorney General for consideration by the Attorney General .... the
Attorney General shall determine, in consultation with the Secretary of State, whether the
assurances are sufficiently reliable to allow the alien's removal to that country," and providing that
"[t]he Attorney General's authority under this paragraph may be exercised by the Deputy Attorney
General or by the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, but may not be further
delegated").
259. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, The Diverging Meaning of Good Faith, 34 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 433, 442-43 (2009).
260. Arar, 585 F.3d at 567.
261. See id. at578.
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legal doctrines balance the relationship between the Judiciary and the Executive,
and those doctrines could have amply addressed Arar's concerns. The special
factors analysis, in contrast, is a peculiarity of Bivens, designed to overcome the
particular separation of powers issue Bivens raises.262 Substituting the
Executive's prerogatives for those of Congress will eliminate thejustification for
doing special factors analysis at all. Rather than allow the Arar holding to
confuse the doctrine and eliminate the rationale of special factors, other courts
should treat the Arar decision narrowly, as a statement about the context of
extraordinary rendition, rather than about the proper way to perform the special
factors analysis.
CONCLUSION
The premise of a Bivens action is that a constitutional "violation... by a
federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for
damages. 263 The point is that the Constitution guarantees certain rights even in
the absence of a statutory remedy. To allow this judge-made cause of action,
courts must determine that there is, in fact, no statutory remedy that addresses the
harms of the plaintiff before them.z6 Courts make this determination through the
special factors analysis, which asks whether Congress has afforded any remedy,
or has decided to provide no remedy, for the violation of a constitutional right. 65
Bivens actions cover those cases for which Congress has neither provided a
remedy itself, nor indicated how courts should address a particular kind of
harm.26 Arar is the rare outlier, having applied this reasoning backwards and
concluding that the absence of any indications of congressional preference bars
Bivens remedies.267 In fact, it is precisely the absence of any indications of
congressional preference that allows for remedies for constitutional damages.
As this Article has shown, special factors analyses in Bivens cases have
developed into an inquiry of legislative will regarding remedies. The inquiry
draws on the tools of federal preemption analysis. There are good reasons to
eliminate the special factors analysis entirely, 268 but lower courts cannot do this
on their own. To avoid the ad hoc (and post hoc) invention of special factors,
which is so tempting in the absence of clear judicial definition, courts should
262. See, e.g., Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 109 (D.D.C. 2011).
263. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
n.4 (1971).
264. Id. at 396.
265. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988).
266. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980).
267. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 581 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[I]f Congress wishes to create a
remedy for individuals like Arar, it can enact legislation that includes enumerated eligibility
parameters, delineated safe harbors, defined review processes, and specific relief to be afforded.
Once Congress has performed this task, then the courts in a proper case will be able to review the
statute and provide judicial oversight ....").
268. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 4, at 141-48.
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adhere to the pattern of the special factors analysis set forth by the Supreme
Court, which is usually implemented by most circuit courts and addresses the
rationale of having courts determine whether to recognize a Bivens remedy in a
particular case. This rationale is the proper distribution of authority between the
judiciary and the legislature.
The public debate that sometimes goes along with high-profile Bivens cases,
such as Arar, should not blind courts to the legislative focus of the special factors
analysis. Public debate may, of course, itself spur Congress to legislate about
such situations. Under the special factors analysis, such legislation would render
the Bivens remedy superfluous. In this sense, figuring out how far Bivens
goes-and figuring out how to understand how far it goes-may be particularly
important now, as the ramifications of executive actions taken in the name of
national security increasingly make their way into public consciousness and into
the courts.
In a principled, precedent-based special factors analysis, a court uses the
tools available for a federal preemption analysis to determine whether Congress
has indicated its intent to prohibit a plaintiff's remedy for constitutional damages
against individual federal employees. To do so, the court first asks whether a
statutory scheme addresses the area at issue, including the kind of harm and the
kind of plaintiff involved. If it identifies such a statutory scheme, the court
ascertains that the statute does not merely touch on some of the issues or interests
in the case: The statute must actually address, not just peripherally relate to, the
area at issue in the case. The court also considers whether the statute indicates
a congressional presumption that Bivens actions would be available for
constitutional violations not covered in the statutory scheme.
Finally, the court should not mistake the Executive for Congress. As with
statutory preemption, whereby administrative agencies can only issue regulations
having a preemptive effect if Congress has delegated them the power to do so, 269
in Bivens cases, it is the statutory scheme that must indicate Congress's wish
regarding remedies. 270  Without proper delegation, the Executive cannot
immunize itself from Bivens remedies. Understanding this fundamental aspect
of Bivens jurisprudence can help courts undertake the special factors analysis in
a way that is consistent, in line with mainstream precedent, and faithful to the
underlying concern animating the special factors inquiry.
269. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
727, 740-41, 760, 768-69 (2008).
270. See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 421-22.
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